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I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that a bankruptcy trustee may assume a debtor's
prepetition executory contract. 1 Less known is the trustee's (or
debtor's) ability to cure and reinstate certain executed contracts-loan
agreements-in reorganization cases.
How is it profitable for a trustee or debtor to assume and reinstate a loan agreement when the obligation to pay is all on the
debtor's side, and the jouissance of receiving payment entirely on the
creditor's side? There are three sources of profit. First, if the con-

' See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994).
• Chapter 11 provides for a debtor in possession-a fox standing guard over the henhouse. This principle is nowhere stated expressly. We learn, however, that an independent
trustee or examin~r can be appointed for cause or if such an appointment is in the best interests of the creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). This implies that, until such an event
occurs, the debtor in possession serves as the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994) ("A debtor in possession shall have all the rights ... of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.");
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co. v. Holly's, Inc. (In re Holly's, Inc.), 140 B.R. 643, 685 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1992) (Gregg, J.) ("In a chapter 11 case, the debtor in possession retains management of the business unless a party in interest demonstrates that appointment of a trustee is
necessary.").
In chapters 12 and 13, the debtor does not serve as the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1202,
1302 (1994). The trustee is a "standing" official who receives postpetition payments from the
debtor and distributes them to the creditors mentioned in .the plan. Meanwhile, the debtor
has sole power to file a plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1321 (1994).
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tract rate of interest is lower than the market rate, a debtor profits
by reinstating the contract. If the security agreement is not reinstated, the debtor in possession may have to pay cram down interest at
the market rate. 3 Accordingly, reinstatement is obviously preferable
when the contract rate is favorable and the creditor is oversecured.4
The second advantage adheres only in chapter 12 (farm reorganizations) and chapter 13 (wage earner reorganizations). In these
chapters, reinstatement is valuable because the reorgariization plans
can last only three (or, with court permission, five) years. 5 A reinstated security agreement, however, may last longer" and obviate the
need for refinancing.
Third, in chapter 137 (and, since 1994, in chapter 11),8 long
term mortgage agreements secured only by the debtor's residence
may not be modified. 9 This same mortgage agreement can be as-

' "Cram down" is slang for the notion that, where the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)
are met, creditors can be made subject to the plan, despite the fact that the class of creditors
to which they belong voted against it. It also refers to 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (5) and 1325(a)(5),
which provide that dissenting secured parties are entitled to the value of their collateral as a
condition of plan confirmation.
4
See In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 420 (7th Cir. 1984) (Coffey, J.). Even
when the creditor is undersecured, a debtor might still benefit financially, but this advantage
would depend on a cost-benefit calculus. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89. In the case
of assumption and reinstatement, the lower contractual interest rate is the benefit, but the cost
will be that the debtor must pay the unsecured deficit at 100 cents on the dollar. In cram
down, a debtor-in-possession would only have to provide the unsecured deficit claim with the
amount it would have been allocated in a liquidation of the bankruptcy estate. When the debtor is insolvent, such an allocation will be less than 100 cents on the dollar. Thus, even when a
co.Iltractual interest rate is low, an insolvent debtor in possession may not wish to assume and
reinstateloan agreement~ when a creditor is radically undersecured.
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(d), 1322(d) (1994).
" See In re Pruett, 178 B.R. 7 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Caddell,].) (holding that if a security agreement is not reinstated, the secured claim must be paid within the life of a chapter 13
plan); Brown v. Shorewood Fin., Inc. (In re Brown), 175 B.R. 129, 132-33 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1994) (Feeney,J.) (same); In re Comans, 164 B.R. 539 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994) (Ellington,J.)
(same). A short-term note with a balloon payment may have connected with it the expectation
that the creditor will renew it, but this alone does not authorize a plan to extend the note to a
twenty year stream of payments. See Citizens Trust & Savs. Bank v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 99
B.R. 352 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (Enslen,].). Similarly, a perpetual guaranty of advances made to
another does not justify extension beyond the five year limit, where the actual advances are
themselves short-term obligations of the third party. See In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499, 504-05
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (Howard,].).
7
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1994).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1994). Congress added this provision to discourage wage
earners from defecting from chapter 13 to chapter 11 in order to cram down a residential
mortgage. See Bankmptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 206(3), 108 Stat. 4106,
4123 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(15) (1994)).
" In 1994, Congress added an exception to this principle. Under new § 1322(c) (2), a
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sumed and reinstated. 10 Therefore, reinstatement is vital to a chapter 13 wage earner who aspires to save the family homestead. But for
reinstatement, the mortgagee would be entitled to relief from the
automatic stay because the home would be superfluous to effectuation of a chapter 13 plan. 11
If a debtor elects to assume and reinstate a security agreement,
the debtor must "cure" certain past defaults. 12 What constitutes a
"cure," however is as controversial in bankruptcy law as it is in medicine. In Rake v. Wade, 13 the Supreme Court, per Justice Clarence
Thomas implied that cure was governed by two Bankruptcy Code
provisions pertaining to secured claims-§ 506(b) (which guarantees
postpetition interest only to oversecured creditors) and cram
down. 14 As this article shows, cure claims are not coherently viewed
as secured claims when the collateral is insufficient to cover both the
reinstated principal and the price of cure. Hence, Rake v. Wade
caused many conceptual problems with cure and reinstatement of
security agreements.
Displeased by Rake v. Wade, Congress intervened in 1994 with
some disturbing amendments to the reorganization chapters. 15
These amendments shift the paradigm of cure from the inadequate

chapter 13 debtor may bifurcate a home mortgage if "the last payment on the original payment schedule ... is due before the date on which the final payment under the plan is
due .... " Section 301(2), 108 Stat. at 4131 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994)). Since
chapter 13 plans la~t no more than three years (or, with court permission, five years), see 11
U.S.C. § 1322(d) (1994), a great many home mortgages will be immune from bifurcation.
111
See_l 1 U.S.C. §§ l 123(a) (5), 1322(b) (5) (1994). Controversy exists over whether a debtor may pay the reinstatement amounts directly to the secured party or whether the payments
must be made through the chapter 13 trustee. Compare Wagnerv. Armstrong (In re Wagner), 36
F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bowman J.) (outside payment permitted in chapter 12); In re Berru1rd, 201 B.R. 600 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Feeney,].) (outside payment permitted in chapter
13); United States v. Donald (In re Donald), 170 B.R. 579 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (Pickering,].) (same)
with Fulk1Vll v. Savage (In re Fulkrod), 973 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1994 (per curiam) (outside payment permitted in chapter 12); In re Harris, 200 B.R. 745 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Kenner,].)
(outside payments not permitted in chapter 13). The standing trustee,. whose fee is calculated
as a percentage of money handled, obviously prefers that reinstatements be run through the
plan. See Michaela M. White, The Effects of Chapter 13 Plan Confinnation and Case Conversion on
Property, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 785 (1993).
11
See Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard,].).
12
See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124(2)(A), 1222(b)(2), 1322(b)(2) (1994).
" 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
14
Id. at 470-71.
"' These amendments affect any bankruptcy proceeding filed on or after October 22,
1994. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 § 702(a), 108 Stat. 4106-4150. A
different effective date applies for the new definition of "cure." See. infra note 268 and accompanying text.
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Rake v. Wade theory to an equally unsatisfactory contractual theory:6 Under this contractual theory, secured creditors may provide
the terms of their own cure in their agreements. The physician may
heal herself, choosing such luxury medicines and comforts as may
indulge her notion of financial wellness. As always, it is the unsecured creditors who will pay the bill of reinstatement. Because cure
is not compensatory, 17 assumption and cure of loan agreements
surely will become more expensive and less common, as debtors and
trustees will find the cure to be worse than the disease.
The purpose of this article is to pose an alternative theory of
cure. According to this new theory, cure should be compensatory,
federal, and, noncont(actual-a matter of tort, if you will. Such a
theory defines cure as the price of reinstating a security agreement
which, if unaccelerated, still requires future payments of principal or
interest going forward. The theory calculates the cure price as repayment of amounts past due under the contract, as augmented by a
market rate of interest between the time of default and the time the
cure price is calculated. In addition, if the cure price is to be paid
over time after confirmation (permitted in chapters 12 and 13), the
present value of those deferred payments must equal the calculated
cure price. In short," both preconfirmation interest and
postconfirmation interest at the market rate will be required. Thus,
coupled with reinstatement of the agreement, the cure price would
make the creditor indifferent to the fortuity of bankruptcy.
The difference between a pure compensatory theory and the
Rake v. Wade theory is that the compensatory theory would apply to
over- and undersecured creditors alike. In contrast, the Rake v. Wade
theory applies § 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) only to oversecured creditors, 18 leaving no theory of cure for undersecured creditors. A sa-

u; One part of the amendment is noncontractual. In 1994, Congress set a federal deadline (the foreclosure sale) for cure and reinstatement, regardless of the content of the contract or state law. See infra notes 161-86 and accompanying text.
7
'
Economists may object that since cure is defined in the contract, and because a secured creditor will have surrendered benefits to the debtor in exchange for the concessions on
cure is inherently compensatory. This point must be conceded-at least at the level of economic theology. I have in mind a narrower concept of "compensatory." A "compensatory"
theory of cure would equate the cure price with the monetary defaults or principal and ordinary interest payment5, augmented by the lender's actual opportunity cost (i.e., market rate of
interest) incurred because the lender failed to receive payment on time. The cure therefore
"compensates" for, or renders the debtor indifferent to, the fact of bankmptcy.
'" To be more precise, § 1325(a)(5) governs the secured portion of an undersecured
claim. See 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5) (1994). Arrears become part of the secured claim only if a
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lient difference between a compensatory theory and the contractual
theory of the 1994 amendments is that, under the compensatory
theory, courts could ignore default penalties and postdefault interest
rates called for in the contract.
This suggestion might have been instituted without the need of
legislation until 1994, when Congress provided an explicit definition
of "cure." In light of the 1994 amendments, it is possible that legislative intervention will be needed. Ordinarily, it might seem quixotic
and vain to suggest that Congress should open its ponderous and
marble jaws to cast up legislation so recently enacted. Yet, along with
amending the Bankruptcy Code in 1994, Congress also established a
Commission to review the Bankruptcy Code in general. 19 Presumably, this Commission will not flinch at reviewing and suggesting
changes in the 1994 legislation. Therefore, a proposed new theory of
cure may yet undeaf congressional ears.
Even if the wind and tempests of politics do not blow in the
direction of legislative reversal, a compensatory theory of cure might
still be useful to have on the following basis. The 1994 amendments
allow the contract to govern the cure price. They do not permit the
institution of punitive measures. Penalties are not cures. Hence, it is
open for courts to declare that any given contract penalizes the debtor and therefore must be disregarded. The difference. between a
penalty and a cure is that the former is disconnected with compensation, while the latter merely compensates a creditor for harms done.
Hence, even under the current regime, courts must have a notion of
what compensation means. When a contract deviates from that concept, the courts will know that they are faced with punition dressed
up in the benevolent clothes of cure. In short, the devil hath power
to assume a pleasing shape. Although the 1994 amendments indicate
that the contract is the theme of cure's tongue, in fact cure inevitably speaks for itself in a noumenal way. Cure already has a covert
federal soul. The contract is merely evidence of that soul-the appearance and not the reality of cure.
In order to compare the cure with the underlying concept of
reinstatement, Part II of this article reviews the relevant statutory
criteria of reinstatement and their differences in the various reorganization chapters. Part II will help emphasize the distinction between

court consciously allocates them to the secured portion and the reinstated amount to the unsecured portion.
"' Section 601-10, 108 Stat. at 4147-50.
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reinstatement and cure, the latter idea being nothing else but the
price a debtor must pay to achieve reinstatement. Part III will then
assess the state of cure prior to and in light of the 1994 amendments. Finally, Part IV will discuss the new theory of cure and reinstatement being presented.
II.

REINSTATEMENT

A. Chapter 7

Chapter 7 liquidation does not allow for the reinstatement of
loan agre(!ments. Although "executory contracts" may be assumed
and assigned by trustees to the profit of unsecured creditors,20 loan
agreements may not. They are "executed" contracts. That is, under
definitions developed in case law, 21 loan agreements are not executory because they do not usually provide for material duties on each
side of the contract. Nor do they provide for material nonmonetary
obligations from either side. Accordingly, loan agreements do not
fall within the ambit of § 365. 22
In the absence of reinstatement in chapter 7, the Bankruptcy
Code automatically accelerates loans, making principal payments due
in the future presently payable. This proposition is established in
subsection 502(a) and (b) which provide that:
(a) A claim ... proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title,
is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest ... objects.

20

Section 365(a) allows for the general assumption of executory contract~. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(a) (1994). Section 103(a) makes§ 365(a) applicable in chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(1994).
2
' See generally Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional A~ialysis of Executary Contmcts, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 227 (1989).
,,., A great many courts w~uld hold that a chapter 7 trustee has neither a theory under
which nor an incentive to assume and reinstate a loan agreement. While it is true that a debtor and a creditor may, under close court supervision, agree to reinstate a prepetition loan
agreement under§ 524(c), such reinstatement requires creditor ~onsent. Nevertheless, a minority of courts think that they could declare a security agreement' to be out of default and
reinstate it for the benefit of the debtor. Coupled with this declaration of no default is a judicial injunction extending beyond the chapter 7 distribution, preventing any foreclosure of
collateral until the debtor actually default~ in the future. This controversial theory is beyond
the scope of this essay, which will consider only the type of cure and reinstatement authorized
in the reorganization chapters. For a discussion of the unilateral reinstatement of security
agreement~ in chapter 7, see David Gray Carlson, Redemption and Reinstatement in Chapter 7
Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 289 (1996).
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(b) ... if such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice
and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful
currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount ... 23

The language in section 502 (b) allows a claim for any principal
amount due and owing in the future, which shall be treated as 1due
and owing "as of the date of the filing of the petition. " 24
Since a claim is allowed "as of' the petition date, postpetition
interest is implicitly never part of an allowed claim, so far as
§ 502(b) is concerned. 25 For good measure, an exception to
§ 502(b) disallows any claim for "unmatured interest." 26 Putting the
preamble together with the exception, any creditor is entitled to
claim prepetition interest and principal, plus an acceleration of any
principal due and owing in the future. A creditor may not claim
postpetition interest,27 except that oversecured · creditors may have
postpetition interest pursuant to§ 506(b), which states:
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property
the value of which, after any recovery under [§ 506( c)], is greater
than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder
of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs,
or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim
arose/8

If, however, all creditors have been paid in a chapter 7 liquidation,
§ 726(a) (5) indicates that all of the unsecured creditors are to be
paid interest on their claims at the legal rate. 29
These rules apply in chapter 7, but, indirectly, in reorganization
as well. Each reorganization chapter accords creditors the right to

23

11 U.S.C. § 502(a)-(b) (1994).
Section 502 (b).
"'' SeeShearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 944 F.2d 542,543 (9th
Cir. 1991) (Leavy,J.).
21
; 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2) (1994).
27
In the 1980's, a theory arose that an undersecured creditor deserves postpetition interest a~ part of her right to adequate protection, but this theory was rejected by the Supreme
Court in the important ca~e of United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Fore.st Associates,
484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Scalia, J.); see generally David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577 (1989).
2
• 11 u.s.c. § 506(b) (1994).
2
"
This residual entitlement to postpetition interest for unsecured creditors will play a
part in the analysis to follow. See infra notes 93-94, 393-94 and accompanying text.
24
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receive as much from a reorganization plan as from a chapter 7
liquidation. 30 Accordingly, chapter 7 distribution rights establish a
minimum entitlement of a creditor in any reorganization proceeding.

B. Chapter 11 and "Disimpairment"
Chapter 11 authorizes the "curing or waiving of any default. " 31
The effect of cure on a security agreement in chapter 11 can be
significant. To see why, an excursus on chapter 11 voting is required.
1. Voting

In chapter 11, the creditors vote on the mode of distribution.
This makes chapter 11 different from chapter 7. While general creditors in chapter 7 elect the trustee, 32 they may not vote on distribution, which is dogmatically fixed by Bankruptcy Code § 726.33 In
chapter 11, howev~r, creditors may vote on the distributional system
promulgated by the plan.
Voting in chapter 11 is by class. There is good reason for this.
Prior to the enactment of Bankruptcy Act section 77B34 and the reorganization chapters that soon followed, 35 businesses were reorganized by means of equity receiverships under the pre-Erie federal
common law. The receiver could not force a creditor to compromise
her claim. A creditor could hold out against a consensual plan in
order to obtain a greater recovery. 36 Accordingly, while the princi"° See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4) (1994). Section
l 129(a) (7) (A) (ii) indicates that a creditor may waive this right by voting in favor of the plan.
The mies in chapter 12 and 13 apply only to unsecured creditors. Secured creditors are guaranteed the value of their collateral. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(5), 1325(a)(5) (1994). To the
extent they have unsecured deficit claims, they are entitled to the protection of§ 1225(a) (4)
and§ 1325(a)(4).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5)(G) (1994).
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994); United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (Souter,].)
(equitable subordination doctrine may not be used legislatively to change chapter 7 priorities).
"' See Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, Pub. L. No. 296, 48 Stat. 911, 913-22.
"'' Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978).
sn See Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F.2d 513, 514 (10th Cir. 1929)
(McDermitt,J.) ("Each bondholder has the absolute right to determine for himself, in case of
default, whether he shall take his loss and quit, or continue to gamble .... "); E. Merrick
Dodd, Reorgflnizfltion Thruugh Bllnkruptry: A Remedy For Whllt?, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1100-03
(1935). The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and the little-used creditor compositions of§ 12 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 also contained class voting. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers
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pal creditors worked and sacrificed to save the going concern of a
firm, the lesser creditors soon recognized the profit in protesting too
much; such creditors were cashed out in full, so that the larger creditors-the ones who really stood to lose if the company were not
reorganized-could proceed by compromise to reorganize the company.
The reorganization legislation therefore introduced cla.ss voting,
so that marginal creditors could not hold up the entire proceeding
in order to get paid.37 The Bankruptcy Code continues these rules.
It requires that two thirds of claims (by amount) in the class vote
affirmatively, and that a flat majority (by head count) also vote affirmatively.38 If the class votes in favor of the plan, dissenting creditors
within the class are forced to go along with the majority, at least for
voting purposes. 39 If the class votes negatively, then the plan may
still be confirmed, but only if the debtor "crams down" the plan
under§ 1129(b).40
It is easy to overestimate the importance of voting in chapter 1 I.
Generally, even if creditors vote negatively, the plan can be con.:.
firmed nevertheless, provided that the so-called "cram down" rules of
§ 1129 (b) are met. This principle is established by the following
phrase in§ 1129(b) (1):
if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section
other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on
request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph ....41

Mayer, Trading Culims mul Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 87
(1990).
37
See Herwig v. Neuses (In re Herwig), 119 F.2d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1941) (Sparks,].) (emphasizing that old§ 77B was founded on the principle of stifling dissent). ·
311
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994).
'" Thus, in In re 11,111, Inc., 117 B.R. 471 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (Kresse!, CJ.), two
minor creditors, classified together with huge yes-voting creditors, demanded separate classification, so that they could preserve their cram down rights .
..., See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994); see generally Olympia & York Fla. Equity Corp. v. Bank
of New York (In re Holywell Corp.), 913 F.2d 873, 879-80 (11th Cir. 1990) (Cox,J.) (describing
the relationship between Bankmptcy Code§§ 1129(a) and 1129(b)); Teamsters Nat'I Freight
Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Trnck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 583 (6th
Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.) ("Confirmation under subsection (b) is commonly referred to as a
"cram down" because it permits a reorganization plan to go into effect over the objections of
one or more impaired classes of creditors.").
41
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Section 1129(a) (8) in turn requires:
With respect to each class of claims or interests(A) such class has accepted the plan; or
(B) such class is not impaired under the plan. 42

Thus, if an impaired class votes negatively, the plan may still be confirmed by means of cram down. 43 A negative vote, then, does nothing more than trigger the cram down protections44-with this important exception: if no class of impaired creditors votes affirmatively, the plan cannot be confirmed, by virtue of the rule in
§ 1129 (a) (I 0). This surprisingly important rule will be discussed
presently. 4r,
2. Impairment

Only impaired creditors may vote in chapter 11. Unimpaired
creditors are deemed to accept the plan. 46 As the legislative history
puts it, "the holder of a claim or interest who under the plan is resto.red to his original position, when others receive less or get nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain. " 47
Section 1124 of the Code describes all claims in chapter 11 as
impaired, with two exceptions: (1) if the plan leaves the creditor's
rights unaltered, or (2) if the plan cures all past defaults and rein-

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).
On what cram down requires, see Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in
Chapter I I Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495 (1993).
44
See In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 838 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (Crabb, J.) ("The
impairment determination can be viewed as a statutorily prescribed measurement for determining when the protections established in [§ 1129(b)] should be accorded a class of creditors.").
"' See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
«; See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(0 (1994). Conclusively so, since 1984. Prior to 1984, some courts
thought that creditors who actually voted negatively would be entitled to cram down rights, like
other negatively-voting creditors, thereby depriving the debtor of the benefits of
disimpairment. See Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Settkment, 60 AM. BANKR. LJ. 69, 84 (1986).
47
S. REP. No. 95-989, 120 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5906. This remark
perhaps underestimates the nearly boundless power of complaint that resides in creditors.
Creditors might complain that, but for bankruptcy, the debtor would have defaulted and creditors could have reinvested liquidation proceeds at a higher rate of interest. Yet Congress has
clearly decided that this excess value in the Joan agreement belongs to the general creditors-not to the specific creditor whose agreement is reinstated.
"

43
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states the security agreement. 48 In either of those situations, the
claim is considered not impaired, and the creditor in question is
deemed to vote affirmatively on the plan. The presumption that
chapter 11 tends to impair all secured claims accords with what the
typical layperson would say about the bankruptcy process. For example, the automatic stay prohibits foreclosure. 49 Moreover, if
undersecured, the creditor gets no postpetition interest. 50 Thus,
these routine features of chapter 11 would seem to be impairment
itself. 51
Because of the strong presumption in favor of impairment, virtually any change in rights proves that a plan does not leave creditor
rights unaltered. Thus, a change in the maturity date 52 or a substitution of debtors53 or collateral54 is an impairment, even if the col-

•• Section 1124(2) provides:
Except as provided in section 1123(a) (4) of this title, a class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or interest of such
class, the plan(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles
the holder of such claim or interest to demand or receive accelerated payment of
such claim or interest after the occurrence of a default(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the commencement of the ca'!e under this title, other than a default of a kind specified in section 365 (b) (2) of this title;
(B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity
existed before such default;
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for any damages
incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance by such holder on such contractual provision or such applicable law; and
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights
to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest.
11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (1994). The preamble to § 1124 refers to § 1123(a)(4) as an exception.
Section 1123(a) (4) requires that a plan provide equal intraclass treatment of creditors, unless
the creditors vote otherwise. Its presence as an exception to disimpairment suggests that discriminatory intraclass treatment makes any claim impaired.
411
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1994).
,.o See United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365
(1988) (Scalia, J.).
51
Cf. In m Dixon, 151 B.R. 388, 393 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1993) (Ellington, C. J.) (suggesting bankruptcy is always a modification of a creditor's rights, and that "modification" prohibited in § 1322(b)(2) is therefore a term of art).
52
See Ronit, Inc. v. Block Shim Dev. Co.-Irving (In m Block Shim Dev. Co.-Irving), 118
B.R. 450, 455 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater,].).
53
See In m Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership, 15 B.R. 952, 956 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)
(Mabey,J.).
54
See In m Gagel & Gagel, 30 B.R. 627, 629-30 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (Anderson,].).
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lateral is better in quality and more in quantity. 55 Lump sum payment in lieu of installments is likewise an impairment. 56 By some
accounts, even an improvement in position is an impairment. 57 On
the other hand, courts might overlook minor "technical" impairments.58
Impairment had been defined under old chapter X as a "material and adverse" effect on a claim. 51) Such a standard entailed vexing
valuation criteria. Obviously, the Bankruptcy Code has lightened the
standard,60 and it has been suggested that the standard should not
depend on any quantitative effects on the value of a creditor's claim,
but merely on qualitative change of any sort. 61 Impairment should
be found easily, and chapter 11 plans should rise and fall on cram
down criteria. 62

'''' SeeMARTINj. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 596 (1987).
,,n See In w Otero Mills, Inc., 31 B.R. 185, 186 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983) (McFeeley, J.).
7
''
See In re Temple Zion, 125 B.R. 910, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (Scholl, J.). In L & J
Anaheim Asso1:~. v. Kawrm1ki /,easing Int'[, Inc. (In w L&] Anahrim Assot:i-.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir.
1993), a secured party proposed it5 own chapter 11 plan, which consigned the unsecured deficit claim to a unique cla5s and awarded the unsecured deficit claim improved rights. See id. at
941-42. This unique cla5s was the only one voting affirmatively on the plan.Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain mled that the cla5s was impaired by virtue of its improved rights. See id. at 943. As a
result, the plan could be confirmed because, by this dubious means, the secured party had
met the requirements of§ 1129(a)(l0). Nevertheless, courts disagree as to whether an improvement in position is an impairment. In Bustop Shelters of Louisville, Inc. v. Classic Homes, Inc.,
914 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1990), a plan a5sumed a security agreement and provided for a secured
party to obtain a surety in addition to the debtor's continued liability. See id. at 812. The additional surety-an improvement in position-was held not to be an impairment, even though
the debtor's equity in the collateral was transferred to the surety. Although these changes "altered" the creditor's prepetition right5, Judge Cornelia Kennedy ruled that the secured party
was not impaired, and its vote could not count in aid of the plan. See id. at 815-16. Bustop
might be reconciled with Anaheim Assodates by observing that the contractual relations between
the secured party and the original debtor were left untouched; the creation of new relations
between the secured party and the surety did not therefore alter the original debtor-creditor
relationship.
For another case denying that improvement in position is an impairment see In re Boston
Post Road Ltd., 145 B.R. 745, 747 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (Krechevsky, C. J.), affd, 154 B.R.
617 (D. Conn. 1993), riffd, 21 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 897 (1995).
''" See In w Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 B.R. 558, 562 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983)
(Proctor, J.) (change of management violated covenant but wa5 overlooked on the grounds
that it was "technical").
'" See In reWitt, 60 B.R. 556,561 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa, 1986) (Hill,].).
'" See id. at 560.
"' See L & J Anaheim A5socs. v. Kawasaki Lea5ing lnt'I, Inc. (In w Anaheim Assocs.), 995
F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain,J.) (citing In re Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership,
15 B.R. 952, 962 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Mabey,].)).
"! Thus, in Toibb 11. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991),Justice Harry Blackmun held that, under
the literal words of the Bankruptcy Code, a consumer could file a chapter 11 plan. When the
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A major purpose of reinstatment in chapter 11 is for the security agreements to stand as an alternative to cram down rights under
§ 1129(b). Only creditors in no-voting classes are entitled to invoke
cram down protection. Reinstated creditors are presumed to vote
affirmatively. Reinstated creditors are thus denied the two important
principles of cram down. According to the first, a secured creditor
class voting no on the plan, must, in effect, be given the equivalent
of the collateral. This may be in one of three forms: (A) the present
value of the collateral, in the form of debt payable over time, 63 (B)
the present value of the cash proceeds,64 or (C) the indubitable
equivalent of the claim. 65 A second principle applies only to unsecured creditors, but is relevant to undersecured creditors with unsecured deficit claims. Unsecured creditors are entitled to assert the
absolute priority rule, according to which no junior creditor or interest holder is entitled to any property until the negatively-voting creditor is paid in full. 66
Neither of these principles applies to unimpaired or disimpaired
claims. Thus, a secured creditor whose claim is reinstated is not necessarily entitled to the value of collateral or its indubitable equivalent. And no reinstated creditor has standing to assert the absolute
priority rule when the plan provides for the retention of ownership
by equity participants.
Given the purpose of impairnient as an alternative to cram
down, Judge Ralph Mabey, in the influential case of In re Barrington
Oaks General Partnership,67 suggested that a creditor is impaired if
she could benefit from cram down protection. According to Judge
Mabey, the statutory definition was merely the "formal" approach,
whereas his more creative suggestion was the "functional" approach.
This broader definition encouraged him to declare that, any time
the collateral is sold to a third party contrary to a "due on sale"

objection was raised that consumers under chapter 11 could keep their postpetition wages
when chapter 13 debtors could not, Justice Blackmun dismissed the objection by noting that
creditors are at least as well off in chapter 11 as they are in liquidation. See id. at 164. In other
words, Justice Blackmun mled that creditor welfare, not technical criteria, should decide the
appropriateness of a chapter 11 plan. This instinct supports a very broad definition of impairment.
'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
,;.i
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).
'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
66
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
67
15 B.R. 952 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
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clause (i.e., a clause that accelerates the loan whenever the debtor
sells the collateral to a third· party), the secured party is impaired,
even if the third party assumes the loan obligation, because a different debtor constitutes a different risk. He admitted, however, that
the slow-footed "formal" approach would have sufficed to reach this
result.6/l
Judge Mabey's innovation seems to presume that the creditor in
mind is voting negatively on the plan. His rule succeeds in giving
such a negative-minded creditor access and passage to cram down. If
followed, the rule must shake the debtor from her fell purpose of
capturing value from the secured creditor. Under the Barrington
Oaks definition of impairment, a plan could be confirmed only if the
present value of the reinstated security agreement equalled the value
of the collateral. Yet no debtor would reinstate a contract unless it
was cheaper than cram down. Hence, Judge Mabey's rule deprives
reinstatement of all utility as an alternative to cram down. In recent
years Barrington Oaks has not been followed-though the Ninth Circuit has recently cited the case with approval. 69

3. One Class Must Vote Affirmatively
Class voting controls whether cram down standards must be
applied to a chapter 11 plan. It does so in two ways. First, by virtue
of class voting, dissenting creditors who are outvoted by the other
members of their class do not have standing to insist on the cram
down standards. 70 Second, if no class votes affirmatively, then
§ 1129(a) (10) prevents confirmation, even if cram down standards
could be met. 71
According to § 1129(a) (10), confirmation can occur "if a class
of claims is impaired under the plan, [only if] at least one class of
claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, deter-

i;•
Id. at 966; cf. Bustop Shelters of Louisville, Inc. v. Classic Homes, Inc., 914 F.2d 810,
814-15 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kennedy,].) (sale of collateral without more not per se impairment).
'*' See L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int'I, Inc. (In re Anaheim Assocs.), 995
F.2d 940, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain,J.).
70
To be sure, dissenting creditors may occasionally insist that various parts of§ l 129(a)
prevent confirmation of the plan. For example, even if a class votes "yes," the outvoted members of the class may still insist that they receive as much from the plan as they would have
received from a chapter 7 liquidation of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § l 127(a) (7) (A)
(1994).
71
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10) (1994).
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mined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider. "72 This provision is the source of a secured creditor's "classification veto." 73 The veto depends on the rule (contained nowhere in
the Bankruptcy Code) that like claims must be placed in the same
class. 74 According to this important strategy, the undersecured creditor admits that the secured portion of her claim deserves unique
classification because its priority to the collateral is unique.75 The
unsecured deficit claim, however, is alleged to be identical to the
claim of any other unsecured creditor. 76 If this rule is enforced, and
if the undersecured creditor's deficit claim is large enough (one
third of the unsecured claims in dollar amount or greater) to assure
a no vote from the class, the undersecured creditor hopes to prevent
any class from voting yes. 77 The classification veto obviously depends on the comparative size of the unsecured deficit claim of the
secured creditor to the other unsecured claims. In single asset cases,
where a secured party with a large deficit claim is by far the largest
creditor in the chapter 11 case, the secured party often may assure
that no class votes affirmatively. The strategy stakes all on classification. If the court allows separate classification of the unsecured deficit claim, the secured creditor cannot dominate. The happy unsecured creditors are likely to vote affirmatively, allowing the debtor to
leap the hurdle of§ l 129(a) (10) into the briar patch of cram down.
Cure and reinstatement of a security agreement cannot help a
debtor in possession meet the provisions of§ 1129(a) (10), which
requires the affirmative vote of an impaired class of noninsider credi-

,., Id.
73
See David Gray Carlson, The Classification Veto in SinglR A.1;~et Cllses Under Bankruptcy Code
Section 1129(a)(]0), 44 S.C. L. REV. 565 (1993).
;, See id. at 573-77. Section l 122(a) prevents different claims from being put in the same
class, but it does not bar similar claims from being put into different classes.
"' Secured creditors are almost always separately classified for this reason. See In re Richard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840 (Bankr. E.D.
1991) (Scholl,].).
w On whether this vital premise is valid, see Carlson, supm note 73.
77
One problem that nonrecourse lenders presently face is that their deficit claims are not
given the same priority as other unsecured claims. In chapter 11, nonrecourse creditors are
given "artificial recourse" under§ 1111 (b) (l)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b)(l)(A) (1994) but these
artificial recourse claims have a lower priority than recourse claims. This is due in large part to
the workings of§ 1129(a)(7)(A), which requires every creditor in chapter 11 to obtain at least
as much as they would in chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (1994). In chapter 7, the artificial recourse claim does not exist, and so artificial recourse claimants are never entitled to
payment, whereas other unsecured creditors are entitled to some positive amount (where at
least some unencumbered asset~ exist in chapter 7). See Carlson, sufmt ~ote 73, at 582-87.

Pa.

1997]

Rake's Progress

289

tors.711 Thus, even if a debtor-in-possession disimpairs large numbers
of angry creditors, the debtor still lacks the necessary yes vote. For
this reason, debtors sometimes locate a happy class of creditors and
nick them only slightly so that they scarcely feel their impairment
and are still pleased to vote affirmatively. If this can be accomplished, the debtor will have met the provisions of§ 1129(a) (10).
Prior to 1994, the Bankruptcy Code deemed a claim unimpaired
if the creditor received full cash payment on the effective date of the
plan. 79 Thus, any class of creditors receiving cash on the effective
date of the plan were deemed to be voting in the affirmative. This
concession, however, was counterproductive to debtors because such
a class could no longer help the debtor meet the § 1129(a) (10)
requirement.Ho Debtors therefore preferred to write plans in which
the happy unsecured classes received 100 cents on the dollar thirty
days after the effective date.H 1 Since a thirty-day wait was considered
an impairment, the class was impaired and their affirmative vote
could be counted as satisfying§ 1129(a) (lO)'s stern challenge.
To save their classification veto, secured creditors would claim
that delaying cash payment for thirty days was an impairment of
such a minor or de minimis nature as to be unnecessary or artificial. H2 Artificial impairment, they argued, should be disregarded in
the name of equity-an equity that supposedly demanded their right
to veto an otherwise qualified chapter 11 plan. Although the matter
was controversial, prior to 1994 the howl of artificial impairment was
enough to shatter many a chapter 11 plan. 113
The slanderous insult of "artificial," 114 however, depended great'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10) (1994).
'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(3) (repealed 1994).
0
"
Venturing through the mists of history-to the days before 1984-§ 1129(a)(l0) was
unclear at to whether an unimpaired class must expressly vote affirmatively for a plan, or
whether the deemed affirmative vote of an unimpaired class might suffice. Since § 1129(a) (10)
initially failed to specify whether the affirmatively voting class was required to be impaired,
courts were bitterly divided on the question. See Ethan D. Fogel, Cmifimuetion and the Unimpaired Guess of Creditors: Is a "Deemed Acceptance" Deemed an Acceptance?, 58 AM. BANKR. LJ. 151
(1984). In 1984, Congress made clear that the affirmatively voting class needed to be impaired
under the plan. See Bankmptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-953 § 512(a)(9), 98 Stat. 333,386 (1984) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1994)). This
1984 amendment greatly strengthened the possibility of a classification veto for undersecured
creditors.
"' David Gray Carlson, Artificial Impairment and the Sing/,e Asset Real 'Estate Bankruptcy, 23
CAP. U. L. REV. 339 (1995).
"' See id. at 361-62.
"' See id. at 353-68.
,.., "It is said that upon being shown the newly built St. Paul's cathedral, King Charles II
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ly on the insinuation that a debtor in possession could have paid cash
to the affirmative voters on the effective date, but did not. In 1994,
Congress amended the definition of "impairment" to delete the
notion that those paid cash on the effective date are unimpaired. 85
Today, such creditors are deemed to be impaired creditors.
Ironically, Congress did not make this deletion to weaken the
classification veto. Rather, Congress sought to reverse a notorious
case-In re New Valley Cmp.116-in which a solvent debtor in possession avoided paying postpetition interest to unsecured creditors by
means of disimpairment. According to § 1129(a)(7) (A) (ii), every
creditor must be paid at least as much as the creditor would have
received in a chapter 7 liquidation. 87 Where a chapter 7 debtor is
solvent, unsecured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest at
the legal rate under § 726(a) (5). 1111 Section 1129(a) (7), therefore,
demands that all unsecured creditors simlilary receive interest at the
legal rate. 1111 Yet § 1129(a)(7) (A)(ii) does not apply if the individual
creditor "has accepted the plan." 90 As previously stated, unimpaired
creditors are deemed to accept the plan automatically. 91 Hence,
Judge Winfield ruled logically ~nough that if creditors were paid
cash for the allowed claim on the effective date of the plan and thus
rendered unimpaired, then § 1129(a) (7)(A) (ii) does not apply to
require payment of postpetition interest. 92
Congress, enraged that a solvent debtor could avoid interest
payments by this low trick, struck § 1124(3) from the Bankruptcy
Code.93 In so doing, Congress little realized how much baby went
out with little bathwater. As of October 22, 1994, an undersecured
creditor can no longer claim that the affirmative vote of a separate
class of happy creditors should be disregarded because the debtor

exclaimed 'How awful! How artificial!' and promptly knighted Christopher Wren." Jeanne L.
Schroeder, The Vestal and the F<lSce.1·: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 849 n.163 (1995). In those days "artificial" was a compliment, meaning
"made with great art." "Awful" meant capable of inspiring awe.
"" See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213(d) (3), 108 Stat. 4106,
4126.
"'' 168 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1994).
1
•
Id. at 79; see also II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1994).
RR
l] U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1994).
"" See New Valley, 168 B.R. at 79.
!Hl
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (A)(i).
"' See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
'" See New Vtdley, 168 B.R. at 79.
"' Bankmptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213(d), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126.
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could have disimpaired them by giving cash on the effective date. 94
Receipt of cash no longer disimpairs them. Rather, undersecured
creditors now have to argue that the happy class should be disregarded because the debtor could have reinstated and cured the
creditor's agreement under § 1124(2). Courts are much less likely to
disenfranchise the affirmative voting class on the basis of a mere
potential for assumption and reinstatement. Often, there is nothing
to reinstate, such as where the creditors are suppliers who have already performed and simply wish to be paid.!)5 If paying creditors
(as a means of cure) is the same as assuming and reinstating their
contracts, then Congress will have failed to overrule New Valky. Solvent debtors in possession could still disqualify creditors from
§ 1129(a)(7) (A) (ii) by paying them, and once again these creditors
would lose their§ 726(a) (5) right to postpetition interest. Yet this is
precisely what Congress hoped to prevent by repealing old
§ 1124(3).96
C. Chapters 12 and 13
Chapter 13 is the well known reorganization chapter for wage
earning debtors. Chapter 12, pertaining to the reorganization of
farmers, is its lesser known country cousin. Passed during the farm
crisis in 1984,97 chapter 12 is simply a marked-up version of chapter
13, with changes appropriate to the context of distressed farmers.
There are nevertheless some important differences. In chapter 12,

'" See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Atlanta-Stewart Partners (In re Atlanta-Stewart Partners,
193 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (Kahn,].) (holding against an artificial impairment claim
in light of these amendments).
''-' See infra notes 388-89 and accompanying text.
''" We shall revisit this argument later, in the course of determining what events finally
terminate a debtor's right to cure and reinstate a security agreement. See infra text accompanying notes 310-12.
7
"
For a good description of chapter 12, see Janet A. Flaccus, A Comparison of Farm Bankruptcies in Chapter 11 and the New Chapter 12, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 49 (1988-89). For an
article tracing the history of chapter 12 back to the Frazier-Lemke Act in the Depression, see
James J. White, Taking From Farm Lenders and Farm Debtors: Cha/Jter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13
J. CORP. LAW 1 (1987); Barry G. Grandon, Note, The Family Farm Bankruptcy Act of 1986 and the
Elimination of Lost opportunity Costs Under Chapter 12, 14 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 103 (1987).
Chapter 12 originally had a "sunset" provision that cancelled the chapter on October 1,
1993. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(f), 100 Stat. 3088, 3124. But the popularity of chapter 12 was
strong enough that in 1993, Congress extended the chapter for another five years. See Act of
Aug. 6, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-65, 107 Stat. 311.
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any secured claim may be modified, including a home mortgage.911
Thus, in chapter 12, a farmer need not reinstate a mortgage agreement in order to save the family home. Cram down of the home
mortgagee is always possible. In contrast, both chapter 11 and chapter 13 prevent modification of loan agreements in which the
debtor's residence is the only collateral. 99
l. Voting
Neither chapter 12 nor 13 has any notion of impairment, mainly because there is no class voting in these chapters. To be sure,
voting-like phenomena may be observed in both chapters. For example, secured creditors may waive the right to receive the value of
collateral. 100 In addition, if even one unsecured creditor (or the
standing trustee) disapproves of the reoganization plan, the plan can
only be confirmed if the debtor's "projected disposable income" is
dedicated to the payment .of creditors. 101 Thus, in this very rough
sense, creditors "vote." But there is certainly no class voting. A creditor who somehow found herself in a class of creditors could not be
outvoted into accepting a plan. Each creditor may stand on her
rights regardless of what the class does by way of democratic deliberation.

2. CramDown
In chapter 11, voting has the main significance of triggering the
cram down standards with regard to negatively voting classes. Reinstatement generates an automatic yes vote, thereby disqualifying the
reinstated creditor from cram down. Reinstatement is therefore an
alternative to cram down in chapter 11. In chapters 12 and 13, reinstatement became an alternative to cram down only after 1994.
In 1993, the Supreme Court, in Rake v. Wade, tO'i insinuated

'"' See 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(2) (1994).
'"' See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(b)(5}, 1322(b)(2) (1994). In 1994, Congress added an exception
to this principle with regard to mortgages whose terms do not extend beyond the length of a
chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994). No similar provision was adopted in chapter 11, perhaps because chapter 11 plans can la~t indefinitely, and any such provision would
have subverted the privilege accorded to home mortgages. See infra note 138.
11 1
•
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(5){A), 1325(b)(5)(A) (1994).
,., See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(l), 1325(b)(l) (1994).
'°2 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
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that reinstatement is merely a supplement to cram down. Under the
logic of this ruling, a secured creditor can block a chapter 12 or 13
plan whenever the present value of the reinstated agreement is less
than the value of the collateral. 103 For example, suppose a secured
party claims $100 against collateral worth $120. Cram down therefore demands that the secured party receive a distribution of collateral worth $100. Reinstatement, however, might make the claim
worth only $95, because the contract rate of interest is lower than
the market rate. Rake v. Wade implied that the reinstatement in this
example can be blocked, because the secured party is entitled to the
full $100.
To be sure, Justice Clarence Thomas addressed a different issue
when he exalted § 1325(a) (5) cram down over § 1322(b) (5)
cure. 104 He used § 1325(a) (5) to reason that if cure was to be accomplished over time, the present value of the cure must equal the
full cure price. 105 In other words, he took § 1325(a) (5) to require
that cure payments must be supplemented by "cram down" interest.
Yet, if the overriding nature of § 1325(a) (5) governs cure for this
purpose, it surely restricts reinstatement (as opposed to cure of past
defaults) as well.
The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code have reversed
Rake v. Wade's position on § 1325(a) (5) 's applicability to cure. According to§ 1322(e):
notwithstanding subsection (b) (2) of this section and sections 506(b)
and 1325(a) (5) of this title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure a default, the amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined in
accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable
nonbankruptcy law. 106

Clearly this provision exempts cure of past defaults from the cram
down rules in § 1325(a). Less clear, however, is whether this provision exempts reinstatement of the agreement going forward. Nevertheless,
the above analysis of Rake v. Wade (a cure case) depended on the
principle that what is sauce for the goose of cure is sauce for the
gander of reinstatement. If we apply this principle to the 1994

1113

See id. at 469.
See id. at 471, 473.
wr. See id. at 475.
um 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (1994) (emphasis added).

104
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amendments, then Congress has established reinstatement as. an
independent alternative to cram down. Thus, a reinstated agreement
may freely contradict the rules of § 1325(a) (5). A reinstatement
worth $95 can be instituted even though the collateral is worth more
than $95.
As in chapter 11, reinstatement in chapters 12 and 13 now
serves an alternative to cram down. In addition to this function,
reinstatement ha,s another significant utility in chapter 12 and 13.
Whereas chapter 11 imposes no restriction on how long a reorganization plan might last, a plan in either chapter 12 or 13 must be
concluded within three years (or perhaps five years, if the court
condescends to grant that small extension). 107 A reinstated agreement, however, can last much longer than the plan. Where refinancing is not available on a short term basis, the reinstatement procedure could be very useful indeed to a debtor in chapter 12 or
13, IOH

One line of cases, however, allows cram down and extension of
payments beyond the five-year maximum of§ 1322(d). According to
Judge James Queenan in In re McGregor, 109 § 1322(b) (5) does not
merely refer to reinstatement of long term security agreements. It
also permits long term payouts on cram down, so long as the interest rate and amortization of principal are according to the contract.
Under this line of reasoning, if an undersecured creditor's claim can
be bifurcated consistent with§ 1322(b) (2), cram down is not necessarily subject to the five year maximum. Judge Queenan admits that
bifurcation of home mortgages is not permitted in chapter
13irn_nor may any other right of a home morgagee be modified. 111 But where bifurcation or other cram down tortures are permitted, § 1322(b) (5) provides a mode for extending the plan beyond five years. 112 This view may be criticized, however, for chang-

107

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(c).
"'" See justice v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir. 1988) (Gibson,].) (holding that reinstatement is the sole means of extending payments beyond five years in chapter
12).
0
' "
172 B.R. 718 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
1111
This is the famous holding of Nobleman v. American Savs. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993)
(Thomas,].), discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 120-28.
111
See In re Hatcher, 202 B.R. 626 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (Cornish, J.) (because mortgage agreement called for insurance, debtor had to provide it, in the name of "adequate protection"); In re Legowski, 167 B.R. 711 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Boroff, j.) (debtor could not
reinstate and also eliminate contractual right to accelerate payment after five years).
112
See McGregor, 172 B.R. at 721 ("Subsection (5) does not requite the plan proponent to
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ing an "and" to an "or." According to§ 1322(b)(5), the plan may:
provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and
maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured
claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the
date on which the final payment under the plan is due.

Judge Queenan views cure and maintenance of payments to be disjunctive, so that, so long as contract payments are maintained, cram
down can last in excess of five years. No doubt the "and" should be
taken seriously; extension of payments beyond the five year maximum of the plan should accompany the cure of all past defaults-a
principle which would limit cram .down to the five year maximum
allowed for chapter 13 plans.

3. Bifurcation
One advantage of cram down is the bifurcation of undersecured
claims into two claims-one perfectly secured and one perfectly
unsecured.' 13 Bifurcation allows the unsecured part of the claim to
be paid only a pro rata dividend, like the other unsecured creditors.
Reinstatement, however, is inconsistent with bifurcation of an
undersecured claim. Rather, reinstatement implies that the entire
unsecured deficit claim must be paid according to the terms of the
contract. For this reason, reinstatement of a radically undersecured
claim is not a good strategy for many debtors. In many reorganizations, unnecessary payment on the unsecured deficit claim will outweigh the advantage won by capturing the low contract interest
rate. 114
That reinstatement precludes bifurcation was clear enough under chapter 11. Recall that unimpaired creditors are deemed to vote
affirmatively. Only no-voting creditors are entitled to cram down.

avoid modification of the 'rights' of the secured claim holder. Its command is complied with
so long as payment~ are maintained on the 'secured claim.'"); flccurd, Inn Kheng, 202 B.R. 538
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); In re Murphy, 175 B.R. 134, 137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Feeney, J.);
Brown v. Shorewood Fin., Inc. (In re Brown), 175 B.R. 129 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Fenney,J.).
"~ See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). This is sometimes called "lien stripdown." Lomas Mortgage, Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1 n .. l (1st Cir. 1996) (Lynch,J.). After some controversy, it is now
clear that a final bifurcation can occur if the collateral is sold or if a reorganization plan is
confirmed. See David Gray Carlson, Bifurcfltion of Undersecured Cutims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM.
BANKR. LJ. l (1996).
114
See MARTIN BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 597 ( 1987).
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Section 1124(2) states that a secured claim is deemed unimpaired if
the maturity of the original loan is reinstated •~as such maturity existed before such default." 115 Such a reinstatement applies to the
prebifurcated claim, and so reinstatement in chapter 11 is not consistent with bifurcation. In addition, the chapter 11 plan must not
"otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which
such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest."116 This language similarly precludes bifurcation.
In chapter 13, bifurcation of home mortgages and reinstatement were not initially seen as mutually exclusive. Section
1322(b) (2) prevents "modification" of a "claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 117 Four appellate courts had read the language of
§ 1322(b) (2) very closely and noticed that the secured claim could not
be "modified." 118 By negative pregnant, the unsecured portion of
the claim therefore might be modified. The entire allowed claim
might then be bifurcated, with no offense to§ 1322(b) (2). In effect,
these courts read section 1322(b) (2) to mean that, after bifurcation,
the debtor was required to reinstate principal and interest payments
according to the old schedule, but the mortgage debt would be written down drastically. For example, a twenty year mortgage might
become a thirteen year mortgage. Such a possibility provided distressed debtors no immediate relief, but many years hence, with the
financial crisis passed and the kids safely graduated from college,

"'' Ii U.S.C. § 1124(2) (B) (1994).
11 n

11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (D) (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1994). Some debtors have argued that a court must confirm a
plan when all the requirements of§ 1325(a) are met. Since the antimodification mle is found
in § 1322(b) (2), this argument reasons that plans which modify but do not cure home mortgages can be confirmed. In other words, since the antimodification mle is not found in
§ 1325(a), it is simply not relevant. This argument has been rejected, on the grounds that the
antimodification rule is an implicit condition of confirming a chapter 13 plan. See First Nat'I
Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton,].). Now that chapter 11 has
the same antimodification mle, a like implication will have to be drawn. In contrast, cure and
reinstatement are directly implicated in the confirmation standard of§ 1129(a) because reinstatement establishes the creditor a~ an automatic affirmative voter. As such, reinstatement
becomes an alternative to cram down, because only negative voters can trigger that right. See
II U.S.C. §§ 1129(a) (8), 1129(b) (I).
"" See Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1992) (Cardamore,J.); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th
Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir.
1990) (Sloviter,J.); Houghland v. Lomas & Nettleton Corp. (In re Houghland), 886 F.2d 1182
(9th Cir. 1989) (Fernandez,].).
117
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debtors in their waning years would obtain the welcome but quite
gratuitous benefit of no further mortgage debt service. 119
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 120 the Supreme Court
ruled that bifurcation of an undersecured claim into its secured and
unsecured parts, followed by a cram down of both claims, "modifies"
the secured creditor's rights (even though it does not, strictly speaking, modify the secured claim) . 121 Hence, bifurcation was ruled out.
By implication, reinstatement suggests that the entire unbifurcated
claim of an undersecured creditor must be honored.
Because bifurcation of the home mortgage became impossible
after Nobelman, courts began to take a new look at just what it means
for a creditor to hold "a claim secured only by a security interest in
real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 122 Thus, if
the mortgage lien encumbers things other than the residence,
Nobelman was said to be inapplicable. 123 For instance, if the mortgage agreement covers personal property, the entire mortgage may
be modified. 124 Some courts even ruled that extension of the mort-

1 1
"

See In re Honett, 116 B.R. 495, 497-98 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990) (Sharp, J.) (payments
maintained, but maturity date foreshortened).
120
508 U.S. 324 (1993) (Thomas,].).
121
See id. at 331-32; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
122
11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1994).
123
See Lomas Mortgage, Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (Lynch,J.) (mortgage on
multifamily dwelling where debtor-landlord lived could be modified); In re DaCosta, 204 B.R. 1
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Feeney, J.) (same, where family members lived in other apartment
rent-free). But see Brunson v. Wendover Funding, Inc. (In re Brunson), 201 B.R. 351 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1996) (Kaplan, J.) (antimodification rule applicable to multi-family dwelling where
predominat intent was to provide debtor a residence); In re Spano, 161 B.R. 880, 885-87
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (Shiff,J.) (where debtor rented out part of his home after the mortgage was executed, secured creditor was still entitled to protection of§ 1322(b)(2)). The test
for whether extra collateral exists to spoil § 1322(b) (2) protection should be performed on
the day of the chapter 13 petition, to prevent creditors from shedding collateral in order to
qualify for it. See In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499, 505-06 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (Howard, J.);
In re Green, 7 B.R. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (Sidman, J.) (holding postpetition attempt to
cancel security interest in personal property to be in bad faith and not permitted).
124
See Hammond v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Hammond), 27 F.3d 52 (3d
Cir. 1994) (Hutchinson,].); Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Savs., 967 F.2d 918, 925 (3d Cir. 1992)
(finding security interest on wall-to-wall carpeting fatal to § 1322(b)(2) protection); Wilson v.
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1990) (Sloviter, J.) (unperfected
security interest on "appliances, machinery, furniture and equipment" held fatal); Mellon Bank
v. Crystan (In re Crystan), 197 B.R. 803 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (Fitzgerald, J.) (escrow funds
made mortgage modifiable). Judge Ruggiero Aldisert, in Sapos, reversed and remanded because the debtor had not cured past defaults of the mortgage, but, having ruled that the mortgagee had no rights under § 1322(b)(2), cure was no longer strictly necessary. Cram down
would have sufficed, except that the debtor wished to extend payment beyond the five-year
maximum for chapter 13 plans. See Sapos, 967 F.2d at 928.
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gage to fixtures 12" or insurance proceeds 126 is fatal. Sometimes,
mere lanquage in the agreement claiming nonqulaifying collateral
cancels § 1322(b) (2) protection, even though the actual extra property does not exist. 127 Other courts more sensibly said that the encumbrance of fixtures did not take a mortgage out of the
antimodification rule; what is a building after all but a great pile of
fixtures? 128 In support of this view, it has been suggested that the
mortgage in Nobelman itself covered minerals, oil and gas, and profits, showing that such additional collateral cannot strip a residential
mortgagee of the immunity from bifurcation. 129
Surprisingly, cases involving mobile homes have. rarely delved
into the issue of whether the mobile homes are personal property or
fixtures. The antimodification rule of§ 322(b) (2) requires that the
mortgage be "in real property." 130 At least some courts have held
that mobile homes are not real property, 131 but a great many

A contrary case, refusing to find bastardly in a mixed mortgage, is PNC Mortgage Co. v.
Dicks, 199 B.R. 674 (N.D. Ind. 1996), where the mortgage agreement extended to "equipment
now or hereafter attached to or used in connection with said premises." Judge Allen Sharp still
extended the antimodification mle to this mortage, claiming that "the evidence ... leads inexorably to the conclusion that the items of collateral described in the PNC mortgage are nothing more than enhancements capable of becoming component parts of the debtor's principal
residence." Id. at 682. Thus, a security interest on the vacuum cleaner did not disqualify this
mortgagee from claiming antimodification protection.
125
See In re Escue, 184 B.R. 287 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995) (Paine,].); see also In re Jones,
201 B.R. 371 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Stripp, J.) (fixtures, condemnation awards, and insurance
proceeds).
12
" See Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Hill, 106 B.R. 145 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (Todd, J.); In re
Selman, 120 B.R. 576, 578 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990) (Mcfeeley, J.); In re Klein, 106 B.R. 396
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Scholl, J.) (insurance proceeds plus other personalty). Contra, Allied
Credit Corp. v. Davis (In re Davis), 989 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir. 1993) (Peck, J.); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Washington (In re Washington), 967 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1992) (Garza,].).
127
In re Libby, 200 B.R. 562, 567-68 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Tuohey,].); In re Pinto, 191
B.R. 610, 613 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Stripp,J.).
12
• See In re French, 174 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Boroff, J.); Miami Valley Bank v.
Lutz (In re Lutz), 164 B.R. 239, 242 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (Bentz,].); In re Pmitte, 157 B.R.
662, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (Schermer,].); In re Jackson, 136 B.R. 797, 800 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1992)) (Katz, J.); see also Lievsay v. Western Fin. Savs. Bank (In re Lievsay), 199 B.R. 705
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (Volinn,J.) (use of home office did not repeal antimodification protection for home mortgage).
12
" See Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Hirsch (In re Hirsch), 166 B.R. 248 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(Dalzell,].).
0
"
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1994). See United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Witt (In 11' Witt), 199
B.R. 890 (W.D. Va. 1996) (Turk, J.) (ruling mobile homes a fixture, because Virginia taxes
mobile homes as if real estate).
131
See Homeowners Funding Co. v. Skinner, 129 B.R. 60, 64 n.2 (E.D. N.C. 1991) (Fox,
].); In re Comans, 164 B.R. 539,542 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994) (Ellington,].).
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courts simply pass over the issue. 132 If mobile homes are personal
property, then reinstatement and cram down are equally possible for
chapter 13 debtors. 133
Courts have also ruled that when .a home mortgage is entirely
under water, it is not a secured claim at all, and therefore not entitled to the protections of § 1322(b) (2). 134 This claim however, is
deeply problematic, in that it associates the existence of property
rights with a positive value in the marketplace. Not all property
rights hold esteem in the marketplace, yet they are "property" nonetheless. In United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 135 Justice Harry
Blackmun ruled that a valueless debtor equity was part of the bankruptcy estate. If a debtor owns a valueless property interest, so might
a secured creditor. These cases therefore must be viewed as conceptually unsound-a testimony to how far lower courts would bend
logic in order to get around the hated Nobelman opinion.
In 1994, Congress partly overruled Nobelman with respect to
shorter-term mortgages. According to new§ 1322(c) (2):
in a case in which the last payment on the original payment schedule
for a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is
the debtor's principal residence is due before the date on which the
final payment under the plan is due, the plan may provide for the
payment of the claim as modified pursuant to § 1325(a) (5) of this
title. 136

Under this provision, if the scheduled mortgage payments 137 runs
"" See Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggle (In re Hoggle), 12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir.
1994) (Anderson,].); Landmark Fin. Services v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hall, J.);
Southtrust Mobile Servs., Inc. v. Englebert, 137 B.R. 975, 982-83 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (Acker,].)
(applying§ 1322(b)(2) to mobile home, even though security interest apparently covered just
the home: not the land).
'"' A creditor obtaining a security interest on a fixture before it is installed has not been
able to claim that the security agreement governing the fixture is entitled to the
antimodification rule, even if the fixture lender also has a mortgage on the preexisting real
estate. See In re Reeves, 65 B.R. 898 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (Todd, J.); In re Cotton, 199 B.R. 967
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (Mahoney,].). These opinions applied to mobile homes would tend to
deprive the mobile home lender of the antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2), since attachment of the security interest will typically precede affixation to real estate.
"" See Carlson, supm note 113, at 24-25.
"''' 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (Blackmun,J.).
i:m· 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (2) (1994).
m Notice this amendment is carefully written to preclude the argument that, once a debt
is accelerated, a debtor may freely modify the home mortgage. Rather, the invitation to modification insists that the "original payment schedule" be consulted to determine whether the
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out before a chapter 13 plan is finished, the mortgage may be modified.138 In such a case, a debtor might keep her home without reinstating the mortgage agreement. It is not clear how valuable a concession this is to debtors, since chapter 13 plans must conclude within three to five years. 13!1 A debtor in the lag end of a long-term
home mortgage is likely to have paid down so much of the principal
that the mortgagee will likely be oversecured and therefore no longer in danger of bifurcation. Nevertheless, short term mortgages
have become popular. These mortgages are fully subject to bifurcation 140 and other cram down tortures. 141
When bifurcation of a home mortgage is impossible,
§ 1322(b)(5), "notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection,"
authorizes a chapter 13 plan to "provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while
the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on
which the last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under the plan is due." 142 This provision, containing a direct
override of the antimodification rule of § 1322(b) (2), covers the
cure and reinstatement of long-term home mortgages. It permits the

mortgage is short term or long term.
""' This is true regardless of whether the scheduled payments mature prior to the chapter
13 petition or before the plan ends. See In re Sarkese, 189 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1995) (Proctor, J.); In re Lobus, 189 B.R. 216, 218 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (Crystol, ].); In re
Jones, 188 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1995) (Higdon,J.); In re Chang, 185 B.R. 50 (Bankr. N.D.
III. 1995) (Schmetterer,J.).
As of 1994, chapter 11 forbids the modification of home mortgages. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(b}(5) (1994). Congress added no exception for mortgages maturing soon after the
chapter 11 petition, perhaps because chapter 11 plans need not end within five years, as chapter 13 requires. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (1994). Thus, in In re Clay, 204 B.R. 786 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1996), where a chapter 11 debtor owed a balloon payment on a short-term mortgage,
Judge Benjamin Cohen ruled that only in chapter 13 could such a mortgage be modified.
"" See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (1994).
140
See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643, 647 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (Parsons,].). But see United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Witt (In re Witt), 199 B.R. 890 (W.D. Va. 1996) (Turk,].) (Congress
did not intend to permit bifurcation of short-term home mortgage by enacting§ 1322(c)(2)).
141
New § 1322(c)(2) could be viewed a~ the adoption of a minority position, which said
that § 1322(b)(2} 's restriction on modification of home mortgages should not apply to shortterm mortgages, but only to the long-term traditional real estate mortgage. See In re Williams,
109 B.R. 36, 41 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989) (Eisenberg, J.); In re Shaffer, 84 B.R. 63, 65 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 1988) (Pearson,].), rev'd on othergrountls, 116 B.R. 60 (W.D. Va. 1988).
142
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b}(5) (1994). The rule in chapter 12 is identical. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1222(b}(5) (1994). The implication should not be drawn from § 1322(b)(5) that, since
"maintenance of payments" must be continued during the plan, it need not be continued after
the plan. The spirit of reinstatement is that the contractual right to payment or interest may
not be altered from the terms of the contract. No one has yet suggested otherwise.
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reinstated agreement to extend itself beyond the life of the plan. 143
Notice that § 1322(b) (5) refers only to mortgage agreements as to
which "the last payment is due after the date on which the final
payment under the plan is due." 144 After 1994, any agreement in
which the preacceleration scheduled payments run out before the
chapter 13 plan is simply not entitled to the benefit of the
antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2).
4. Acceleration
Prior to 1994, a lively controversy existed as to whether shortterm mortgages could be cured at all. It was sometimes noted that,
whereas § 1322(b)(5) (long-term mortgages) provided a direct override of § 1322(b)(2) 's antimodification rule, 145 § 1322(b) (3) (permitting cure in general) permitted none. 146 One extreme implication was that, once the maturity date of a long term mortgage agreement was accelerated, the entire mortgage agreement precipitated
out of the jurisdiction of§ 1322(b) (5) into the short-term jurisdiction of § 1322(b) (3), which was incapable of overriding the
antimodification rule. In short, once a mortgage debt was accelerated, it was too late to cure and reinstate it. 147 Such a holding would
have all but terminated cure and reinstatement of home mortgages
in chapter 13 cases, because acceleration is very common and often
automatic upon default.
This disastrous argument was rejected on the ground that, regardless of what the statute says, Congress intended something
else. 14R It was suggested that the language from § 1322(b) (5) ("the
last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under

14
'
144

This is also an advantage in chapter 12. See 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(5) (1994).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1994).
14
" That is to say, § 1322(b)(5) allows cures notwithstanding§ 1322(b) (2).
14i; See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (1988).
147
See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Savs. Ass'n, 718 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir.) (Jolly, J.),
rev'd, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Soderlund (In re
Soderlund), 18 B.R. 12, 16 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Kinneary,J.); Susan L. Russell-Chema, Saving the
Family Homestead: Home Mortgages Under Chapter 13, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 905 (1982); Eric Taube,
Comment, Aci:ekmted Mortgages: An Unsolved Probkm of Interpretation in Chapter 13, 19 Haus. L.
REV. 951, 968 (1982).
"" See In re Roach; 824 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton,].). As Judge Edward
Lumbard put it, "we do not believe that Congress labored for five years over this controversial
question only to remit consumer debtors-intended to be primary beneficiaries of the new
Code-to the harsher mercies of state law." Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24,
25 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard,].).
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the plan is due") referred to last payment assuming no acceleration. 1411 In support of this notion, it was claimed that "cure must
comprehend the power to 'de-accelerate."nr,o Furthermore, it was
often suggested that a cure was not a "modification" of the security
agreement at all. 151 On this last view, even cure and reinstatement
under § 1322(b) (3) were completely consistent with the
antimodification rule for the simple reason that cures were not modifications. 152 Meanwhile, policy arguments were asserted to. prove
that accelerated mortgage claims are subject to cure, in spite of
§ 1322(b) (5) 's unavailability. De-acceleration thus prevents a race to
the court house, and encourages debtors to negotiate with the mortgagee, in lieu of filing for bankruptcy. 153
In any event, now that the antimodification rule of§ 1322(b) (2)
never applies to short-term mortgages whose scheduled payment last
less time than the chapter 13 plan, 154 these disputes are outmoded.
Indeed, if debtors turned the tables on secured creditors and used
acceleration to prove that mortga·ges fell under
§ 1322(b) (3)-instead of§ 1322(b) (5)-then the accelerated mortgage is fully subject to modification and cram down by any means.
Fortunately for the secured creditors, this argument has been precluded by§ 1322(c) (2). That section, added in 1994, conditions the
power to modify upon the "last payment on the origi,nal payment scheduut falling before the end of the chapter 13 plan. 155 Hence, debtors may not claim that accelerated mortgages are always modifiable.156
In Nepil, 157 however, Judge Novalyn Winfield ruled that a foreclosure judgment merges with the mortgage agreement and renders
a long-term mortgage into a short-term one-regardless of the language of§ 1322(c) (2). Such a decision is quite unnecessary-federal

14
"

See Grubbl·, 730 F.2d at 241 n.7; Crestline Bldg. & Loan A'!S'n v. Allen (In re Allen), 42

B.R. 360, 362 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (Krenzler,J.).

''"' In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 27.
"'' See infm notes 374-77 and accompanying text.
152
See, e.g., Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 247 (using § 1322(b) (3) to cure junior mortgage of less
than three years); In re Ford, 84 B.R. 40, 42-43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl,J.).
"'' See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 27; Barry L. Zaretsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in
Chapter 13, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 433, 443 (1984); Douglas A. Winthrop, Note, The Chapter 13
Cure Provisions: A Doctrine in Need of a Cure, 74 MINN. L. REV. 921, 930 (1990).
4
"'
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994).
5
"'
Id. (emphasis added).
151
;
See In re Sims, 185 B.R. 853, 857 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Sledge,J.).
1717
206 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1997).
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court have pierced through the merger doctrine and have proclaimed the long-term mortgage still in existence. 158 Furthermore,
the decision puts secured creditors in a dilemma. If they proceed
too diligently in foreclosing their mortgages, the debtor can, with a
properly timed bankruptcy opinion, win the right to modify the
mortgage.
Nevertheless, Judge Winfield had a very intriguing argument
from legislative history-a lesson to staff members who write the
reports that are so influential in litigation. According to the legislative history:
The changes made by this section, in conjunction with those made in
section 305 of this bill, would also overrule the result in First National
Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, with respect to mortgages on which the last payment on the original payment schedule is due before the date on
which the final payment under the plan is due. In that case, the Third
Circuit held that subsequent to foreclosure judgment, a chapter 13
debtor cannot provide for a mortgage debt by paying the full amount
of the allowed secured claim in accordance with Bankruptcy Code
section 1325(a)(5), because doing so would constitute an impermissible modification of the mortgage holder's right to immediate payment under section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 159

In First National Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, ir,o Judge Walter Stapleton
ruled that a chapter 13 plan could not be confirmed which purported to cram down a foreclosure judgment, on the grounds that the
secured creditor was entitled to the benefit of the antimodification
rule. We do not know from the Perry opinion whether the mortgage
agreement (merged out of existence by the judgment) extended
beyond the plan. If so (as was likely), then to overrule Perry is to
permit any judgment of foreclosure to be crammed down, even
though the original mortgage was long-term.
Judge Winfield thought th_e legislative history to be· too vague to
rely on. She preferred to cite the policy of chapter 13 to relieve
debtors, and so she ruled that the debtor could cram down a longterm mortgage, if a judgment of fore closure had been entered.

""' This was done to extend the deadline for cure past the foreclosure judgment. See generally infra Part III.
"'" 140 Cong. Rec. H10752, H10769 (citation omitted).
u;o 945 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1991).
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D. The End of the Right to Cure and Reinstate

The right to reinstatement must eventually come to an end. For
example, after a foreclosing secured party sells collateral to a buyer,
cure and reinstatement necessarily divests the buyer in favor of the
debtor, which we may assume is manifestly unfair. Such a rule would
chill prices bid at foreclosure sales, to the detriment of debtors. 161
We have seen how, prior to 1994, acceleration of the debt had
been soundly rejected as the deadline for reinstatement. 162 However, a division existed as to what the deadline really was. The most
common view was that the foreclosure sale marked the termination
date of the right to cure and reinstate. 163 Some courts thought the
end of the redemption period was the end of reinstatement, because
the collateral was still "property of the estate" until the end of that
time. 164 A few courts took the view that any judgment of default or
foreclosure, even prior to the sale, was the deadline. The theory
behind this last position was that the foreclosure judgment merges
with and eliminates the mortgage agreement. Since the contract was
dead, it could no longer be reinstated. 165
in, See Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1436 (6th Cir. 1985)
(Engel, J.).
"" See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
"" See Commercial Fed. Mortgage Corp. v. Smith (In re Smith), 85 F.3d 1555, 1560 (11th
Cir. 1996) (Birch, J.) (interpreting Bankruptcy Code as it existed prior to 1994); Federal Land
Bank, 760 F.2d at 1436 (chapter 13); In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir.
1984) (Coffey, J.). Sale was proclaimed the deadline even when the buyer was also the mortgagee. See Justice v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1988) (Gibson, J.). A
dissent by Judge Gerald Heaney was entered on this score. He did not emphasize the bid in
quality, id. at 1089-90, but presumably he would not allow property to be taken back from a
third party buyer who had paid cash. See also Goldberg v. Tynan (In re Tynan), 773 F.2d 177,
178 (7th Cir. 1985) (Wright, j.) (holding that third party buyer's payment extinguished secured creditor's claim and terminated any possibility of cure).
rn-1 SeeJim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Spears (In re Thompson), 894 F.2d 1227, 1229-30 (10th
Cir. 1990); Oregon v. Hurt (In re Hurt), 158 B.R. 154, 159-60 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (Ashland,
J.); In re Read, 131 B.R. 188 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1991) (Gordon, J.). Judge Stanley F. Birch argues against the end of the redemption period as a deadline because:
"(A]fter a foreclosure sale occurs, there is no 'unsecured claim on which the last
payment is due after the day on which the final payment under the plan, is due.'
There is also no 'default' to cure or waive. Therefore, there is no ability to cure and
maintain mortgage payments under II U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) or (5)."
Smith, 85 F.3d at 1559 (quoting In re McKinney, 174 B.R. 330, 335 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1994)
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5)). But this argument proves too much. It sustains acceleration
of the debt as the deadline, as all the above attributes are true in case of acceleration.
rnr. See Midlantic Nat'! Bank v. DeSeno (In re DeSeno), 17 F.3d '642, 644 (3d Cir. 1994)
(Roth, j.) (holding also that the foreclosure judgment lien" might be crammed down);
Demers v. Federal Land Bank, 89 B.R. 48, 50-51 (D.S.D. 1987) (Porter, J.), affd, 853 F.2d 605
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When the foreclosure judgment was held to be the deadline
prior to 1994, merger of the security agreement into the judgment
was implicitly held to be fatal to reinstatement. However, a contrary
view existed under which cure and reinstatement were seen as preemptive federal rules that could cancel what state law dictated. 166
That is, security agreements could be separated from the foreclosure
judgment. Indeed; if reinstatement was to be viewed as a federal
rule, merger was no bar to cure and reinstatement. Only if reinstatement was viewed as a nonbankruptcy concept was merger fatal.
Meanwhile, the federal rule was free to develop prudential or equitable limits (such as the sale or the end of the postsale redemption
period) as the final deadline for cure and reinstatement.
Although the 1994 amendments to the reorganization chapters
favor deference to local law, they reversed the field with regard to
the deadline. Section 1322(c)(l) now provides:
Notwithstanding subsection (b) (2) and applicable nonbankruptcy
law(1) a default with respect to, or that gave rise to, a lien on
the debtor's principal residence may be cured under paragraph
(3) or (5) of subsection (b) until such residence is sold at a
foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable

(8th Cir. 1988); In re Celeste Court Apts., Inc., 47 B.R. 470, 476 (D. Del. 1985) (Schwartz,].);
see gmerallyJoseph M. Gaynor, Impairment, 3 BANKR. DEV.J. 579, 589-90 (1986)'.
Incidentally, if the logic underlying the use of foreclosure judgments as the deadline for
cure and reinstatement is that the contract is merged into the judgment, then the "judgment"
is not a contract, and§ 1322(b) (2) no longer applies. See First Nat'! Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945
F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton, J.) ("Upon entry of a foreclosure judgment, New Jersey
establishes a new relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee which includes a right
on the part of lender to immediate payment of the debt from proceeds of a sale of the property. "); In re Gamer, 13 B.R. 799, 801 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Schwartzberg, J.). Section
1322(b) (2) prevents modification of the rights of holders of claims "secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994).
If there really is no contract, then the judgment lien is not a "security interest," because the
Bankruptcy Code defines security interst as a "lien created by an agreement." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101 (51) (1994). Accordingly, foreclosure liens could be bifurcated and crammed down, in
spite of Nobelman. They need not be cured at all. In First Nat'l Fidelity Carp., Judge Walter
Stapleton evaded this point by noting that the foreclosure lien was indeed a security interest,
because it was "created" by a mortgage agreement. First Nat'l Fidelity Corp., 945 F.2d at 64-65.
""' See Jim Waller Homes, Inc., 894 F.2d at 1230 ("Somewhere on the continuum of the
mortgagor's interests under state foreclosure law we must draw a line beyond which there can
be no cure of default."); Boromei v. Sun Bank, 92 B.R. 516 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (Hodges,].).
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non bankruptcy law .... 167

The amendment has the indirect effect of making clear that reinstatement includes the concept of de-acceleration (because acceleration precedes the foreclosure sale). In addition, it clarifies that reinstatements under § 1322(b) (3) are capable of overriding the
antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2). Of course, § 1322(c) (2) simply repeals the antimodification rule outright for short term mortgages.1611 Between these two new provisions, it is clear that shortterm mortgages and accelerated mortgages may be cured and reinstated.
This amendment sets the foreclosure sale as the deadline in the
case of a home mortgage, but it leaves many questions unanswered.
For instance, some courts ruled that reinstatement could occur even
after the foreclosure sale, where a postsale right of redemption existed. i69 Section 1322(c) (1) states that the plan may reinstate a security agreement up to the time of the foreclosure sale, but it does not
exactly rule out reinstatement after that time. Hence, it is possible
that the statute sets no effective deadline at all, except to overrule
the cases holding that the presale judgment was the deadline. Legislative history supports this view. 170 Nevertheless, this view has already
been rejected. 171 In In re Ross, 172 Judge Judith Wizmur ruled that
the deadline implicit in § 1322(c) (1) does not depend on whether
the debtor owns a property interest in the home, such as a right to
redeem after the sale. Rather, "[t]he relevant text of§ 1322(b) [and
now§ 1322(c) (1)] speaks of obligations of the debtor as to which
cure -of a default is authorized .... "173 Thus, according to Judge

167

11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1) (1994).
""' See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994).
"" See Smith, 85 F.3d at 1561; In re Ragsdale, 155 B.R. 578 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (Mitchell,].).
170
According to this legislative history:
This section of the bill safeguards a debtor's rights in a chapter 13 case by allowing
the debtor to cure home mortgage default, at least through completion of a foreclosure sale under applicable nonbankniptcy law. However, if the State provides the
debtor more extensive "cure" rights (through, for example, some later redemption
period), the debtor would continue to enjoy such rights in bankruptcy.
140 CONG. REc .. Hl0752, HI0769 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994).
171
Sometimes with regret. See In re Sims, 185 B.R. 853, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995)
(Sledge,].); In re Rambo, 199 B.R. 747, 751 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996) (Lindsey,].).
172
191 B.R. 615 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996).
173
Ross, 191 B.R. at 617 (quoting In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1372 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987)
(Stapleton, J.)).
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Wizmur, the amendment establishes the sale as the absolute latest
deadline possible. 174
The 1994 amendments mention the sale as a deadline, but
when are foreclosure sales final? In Ross, Judge Wizmur wrote:
We believe the statute is ambiguous in this regard. On the one
hand, the preposition "at" in the phrase "sold at a foreclosure sale"
might signify the intention of Congress to situate the termination
point at a defined and certain event, i.e. the foreclosure auction. On
the other hand, the phrase "that is conducted in accordance with
applicable nonbankruptcy law" modifies "foreclosure sale," and requires resort to state law to determine the procedural regularity of the
actual sale. The term "sold" might refer to the process employed in
each state to complete a foreclosure sale. 175

Judge Wizmur ruled that New Jersey law governed the finality of the
sale and hence the deadline for cure and reinstatement. In her judgment, New Jersey law pointed to the delivery of a deed by the sheriff
to the buyer at the foreclosure sale. 176 In contrast, other judges interpreting New Jersey law have pushed the deadline forward to the
time the auction is concluded, even if the sheriff has not yet issued a
deed; this was the point at which the buyer obtained equitable title
to the land in question. 177
Even other points could have been chosen. For example, New
Jersey law requires deeds to be recorded; otherwise; the grantor has
power to convey better title to a bona fide purchaser for value. 178
Why is not recordation the final moment of "alienation" of the collateral?17!1 Often foreclosure sales must be confirmed by a court;

174

See id. at 617.

i,r, Id. at 618.
1711

See id. at 621.
In re Simmons, 202 B.R. 198 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Winfield, J.); In re Little, 201 B.R.
98 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Gambardella, J.); In re Ziyambe, 200 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996)
177

(Gambardella, J.).
17
"
See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:22-1 (1996).
17
"
See In re Reid, 200 B.R. 265,267 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (Mark,J.); In reJaar, 186 B.R.
148 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (Glenn,J.) (describing deadline as when clerk files certificate of
sale). In In re]ohnson, 171 B.R. 613 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994),Judge Keith Lundin rejected
recordation and put forth execution of the deed as the relevant deadline. He did so as a matter of federal law, however, under the authority of Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760
F.2d 1428 (6th Cir.) (Engel, J.), which expressly rejected state law as setting the deadline. In
contra~t, Judge Wizmur ruled that the 1994 amendments require state law to define when a
sale occurs, which reopens the possibility that recordation is the relevant deadline after all. See
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the § 1322(c) (1) deadline has therefore been set at this late
point. 180 In North Carolina, "upset bids" are allowed by any person
ten days after the auction; the end of this period has been identified
as the deadline. 181
The effect of the new federal cutoff may be to overrule cases
holding that the deadline was the end of the redemption period,
which, in the case of real property, might occur well after the foreclosure sale. But this holding does not mean that redemption is
useless. Rather, it implies that redemption must be accomplished
through a lump sum payment, as per state law, as supplemented by
the minor extension granted in Bankruptcy Code § 1O8(a). 182
"Cure" on the other hand, could have been accomplished over
time.1R3
In addition, the new deadline only covers home mortgages pro-

Ross, 191 B.R. at 618.
'"" See McEwen v. Federal Nat'! Mortgage Ass'n, 194 B.R. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Grady, J.);
In re Rambo, 199 B.R. 747, 750-51 (Bankr, W.D. Okla. 1996) (Lindsey,].); In re Blair, 196 B.R.

477 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996) (Scott,].).
Mc,Ewenwas "ovemlied" by Judge Eugene Wedoffin In re Christian, 199 B.R. 382 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1996), who decreed that the right to cure ended earlier than the order of confirmation. Rather, it ended with the foreclosure auction. As for Mc.Ewen, Wedoff thought the decision was entitled to "substanial deference, but as the opinion of a single judge in a multi:iudge
district, it cannot establish precedent for the district binding on the bankruptcy courts." Id. at
387 (citation omitted).
181
See In re Barham, 193 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (Small,J~).
'"' According to§ 108(b):
Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, if applicable
nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor or an individual protected under section 1201 or 1301 of this title may ... cure a default, or perform any other similar
act, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition,
the trustee may only file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the later of(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.
11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1994). Although this provision does not mention redemption after a foreclosure sale, the section has been held relevant to redemption. See Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1436-37;
Johnson v. First Nat'! Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 278 (8th Cir. 1983) (Roberts, J.); Shawn A.
Holcombe, Comment, The Power to Cure Default Under Chapter 12, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 261, 270
(1990); Patrick J. Potter, How Much Time Do Vendees Have to Cure Their Land Contract Defaults
After Filing for Bankruptcy? Or Does Section 362(a) Really Stay Time?, 11 THOMAS M. COOLEY L.
REV. 45 (1994). Note that§ 108(b) governs a trustee who wishes to redeem. In chapter 12 or
13, the debtor (not a trustee) will wish to redeem. Court~ assume, however, that this rule applies to debtors as well as to trustees. See First Nat'! Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61, 65 (3d
Cir. 1991) (Stapleton, J.).
'"' See In re Sims, 185 B.R. 853, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Sledge, J.); In re Ragsdale,
155 B.R. 578, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (Mitchell,J.).
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tected from modification under § 1322(b) (2). What rule shall apply
for other types of security agreements in chapter 13? 184 What rule
shall apply in chapter 11 or 12? In chapter 11, the question becomes
relevant because new § 1123(b) (5) prohibits modification of the
home mortgage, yet no reinstatement deadline is set. Hence, the
same controversy that plagued chapter 13 will now infest chapter 11,
unless the courts simply borrow the new chapter 13 rule for chapter
11 cases. This, of course, is subject to the dubious criticism that Congress must have known what it was doing when it set a deadline in
one chapter but not the other. 185
Sometimes, real estate mortgages come to an end without a sale.
In Illinois and Michigan, installment contracts can provide that a
debtor's equitable interest in a home mortgage is forfeited to the
seller. Forfeiture had been held to be the deadline .prior to
1994. 186 What shall the rule be as to such cases, which do not in·volve sales at all? 187 In In re Hart, 188 a junior mortgagee exercised

1
•• In re Pluta, 200 B.R. 740 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Boroff,].) (Massachusetts law on cure
of default could not limit right of debtor to cure reinstate security agreement governing car in
chapter 13).
'"'' See, e.g.,Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991) (Marshall,].) (arguing
that expressly providing for bad faith dismissals in one case proves that Congress must have
intended no dismissal in other cases). For a refusal to borrow from chapter 13 to solve a different chapter 11 mortgage problem, see In re Clay, 204 B.R, 786 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (Cohen, J.) (refusing to permit modification of short-term mortgage just because chapter 13 now
permits it).
"i; See In re Layton, 138 B.R. 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (Squires, J.); see generally Potter,
supra note 182.
7
'"
See In re Carr, 52 B.R. 250, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (Spector, J.) (holding that
end of redemption period after forfeiture is deadline). A commentator, Patrick]. Potter, complains that this opinion in effect holds that the automatic stay prevents time from running-that. the automatic stay always extends the redemption period. See Potter, supra note
182, at 65-69. It is also possible to read this case as simply holding that the right to cure accrues with the bankruptcy petition, So long as it accrues during the redemption period, it may
be exercised after the redemption period actually expires. From this perspective, the automatic
stay is irrelevant and does not extend time. Rather, cure becomes a vested right if it accrues
during the redemption period.
Potter also points out that, at least in the Sixth Circuit, conditional sales of real estate
are executory contracts, not security interests. Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469,
473 (6th Cir. 1989) (Kennedy, J.); see Potter, supra note 182, at 68-69. On this basis, he proclaims Carr to be overruled. See Potter, supra note 182, at 69. Therefore,§ 1322(b)(5), which
applies to "executed security agreements," does not apply to the cure of a conditional sale of
real estate. Nevertheless, chapter 13 plans may cure and assume executory contracts. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(7) (1994). Executory contracts may be cured and assumed "at any time before the
confirmation of a plan." 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1994). While cure of a security agreement
must occur in the plan, the deadline for curing an executory contract is not much different.
In either case, the right to cure should outlast the redemption period, so long as it accrued
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its right to pay off a senior mortgage. It then added that amount to
its own fully matured claim. 1119 Judge Paul Glenn ruled that the senior mortgage could not be reinstated because it was dead. Any reinstatement of the junior mortgage had to be according to the terms
of the junior mortgage: 90 Since no sale occurred, can it be clear
this case is rightly decided, in light of the new deadline in
§ 1322(c) (1)? The answers to these questions are unknown.

E. Unfair Discrimination
All of the reorganization chapters prohibit unfair discrimination
between classes of creditors. Chapter 11 provides this rule as part of
cram down. Thus, § 1129(b) (1) requires that "the plan does not
discriminate unfairly ... with respect to each class of claims ... that
is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan." 191 This language means that the negatively voting classes can block confirmation if they can show unfair discrimination against them, compared
to some other class.
Chapters 11 makes classification of creditors largely mandatory.192 Not so chapters 12 and 13. Yet chapters 12 and 13 do state
that, ifa plan classifies claims, the plan "may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated," with the exception that co-signed
consumer debt may be treated differently from other classes of
claims: 93 Nevertheless, in a case where no classes at all were set
forth in a chapter 13 plan, Judge Stephen Mitchell, in In re
DeLauder, 194 ruled that a reinstated security agreement was inherently a different class from that of other creditors, where the debtor
proposed to pay the. secured party outside the plan. 195
This holding required Judge Mitchell to explore whether rein-

during that period. But s1111 In Tl/ Delex Management, 155 B.R. 161, 166-67 {Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1993) {Gregg, J.) {prohibiting assumption of conditional sale of real estate after redemption
period lapsed).
184 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (G)enn,J.).
See id. at 851.
mo See irl. at 858.
"" 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) {]) (1994).
"" See 11 U.S.C. § 1123{a) {I) (1994) {providing for classification of claims, but also providing that administrative creditors, "gap" creditors in involuntary cases, and tax creditors need
not be classified).
"" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222{b) {]), 1322(b) {]) (1994).
iKH

JK9

11

)4

189 B.R. 639 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).

"" See id. at 647.
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stating an. undersecured creditor was unfair, because the unsecured
deficit of the creditor would be payed in full, whereas other unsecured creditors would not receive such favorable treatment. Judge
Mitchell applied a cumbersome five-part test to discover whether
reinstatement was unfair. According to this test, reinstatement must
(1) have a rational basis, (2) be necessary to the debtor's rehabilitation, (3) be in good faith, (4) provide meaningful payments to other
creditors, and (5) impose no great loss on the regular creditors. 196
Applying these factors, Judge Mitchell confirmed a plan that reinstated a security agreement pertaining to the debtor's automobile. 197
Thus, unfair discrimination may conceivably prevent reinstatement
of a security agreement, if the secured party is undersecured and the
above fairne,ss test is offended.
Other courts have suggested that, as a matter of law, the debtor
may always reinstate a contract, regardless of discriminatory effect. 1911 Of course, unsecured creditors are still entitled to assert the
"best interest of the creditors" test;1 99 which guarantees them at
least as much as they would have received in a liquidation proceeding.
F. Discharge

Reinstatement is inconsistent with discharge, but in different
ways from chapter to chapter. In chapter 11, a debtor is discharged
as soon as the plan is confirmed, unless the plan provides otherwise. 200 Of course, if a security agreement is reinstated, it is part of
the plan itself.. Hence, the security agreement is obviously not discharged. Rather, the postconfirmation debtor must live up to the

id. at 643.
See id. at 647.
"'" See In 1li Sullivan, 195 B.R. 649, 657-58 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (Clark, J.); In re Cox,
186 B.R. 744, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995) (Killian,J.); In re Benner, 156 B.R. 631, 634 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1993) (Dreher, J.). These are student loan cases in which the debtor reinstated a
long-term student loan while paying other creditors regular unsecured creditor ·dividend.
100
11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A), 1225(a) (4), 1325{a){4) (1994).
21111
See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d){l)(A) (1994). A chapter 11 plan, by its terms, may defer discharge. If so, it apparently extends the automatic stay. See Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto.
Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J.); In re Arlington Village
Partners, Ltd., 66 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (Waldron, J.) (plan reserved jurisdiction
in bankmptcy court, and secured creditors assumed they had to move to lift the stay before
seeking remedies); Alan M. Ahart & Lisa Elaine Meadows, Deferring Discharge in Chapter 11, 70
AM. BANKR. LJ. 127, 146-47 (1996).
rnn ..';ee

1117
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reinstated security agreement.
In chapters 12 and 13, a discharge can only be granted after the
entire plan is completed,201 though a court has some discretion to
grant a discharge even if the debtor defaults on the plan.202 A reinstated claim, however, is never discharged, because chapters 12 and
13 exempt from discharge any claim provided for under
§ 1222(b) (5) or § 1322(b) (5), respectively. 203 These are the sections that refer to reinstated loan agreements.
Because reinstated mortgages cannot be discharged, some
detors a few years back preferred to file for chapter 7 liquidation,
obtain a discharge, establish the mortgage as nonrecourse, and then
file a chapter 13 case. These were the so-called "chapter 20" cases-a
practice approved by the Supreme Court itself. 204 Prior to
Nobelman, a chapter 20 debtor with a general discharge in chapter 7
could bifurcate the undersecured nonrecourse claim in a subsequent
chapter 13. The "secured claim" of the mortgagee could not be
modified, but the unsecured deficit was quite vulnerable. The mortgagee had to be paid the value of the collateral, on the schedule
provided in the original loan agreement. But, since the unsecured
deficit had been discharged, the debtor could allocate zero dividends on this part of the mortgagee's claim. 205 After Nobelman,
cure and reinstatement must provide for the payment of the entire
mortgage debt, including the unsecured deficit, even if it is nonrecourse. 206 Hence, the utility of chapter 20 is much diminished for
debtors.
Suppose a plan illegally modifies a home mortgage, but the
secured party mounts no protest at the confirmation hearing. The

201
202
2113

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228{a), 1328(a) (1994).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(b), 1328(b) (1994).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(a)(l), 1228(c)(l), 1328(a)(l), 1328(c)(l) (1994).

'"' SeeJohnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 80 (1991) (Marshall,J.). The informal
name "chapter 20" results from the witty practice of summing the chapter 7 case with the later
chapter 13 case. See Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down to
Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8 BANKR. DEV.J. 131, 173-80 (1991).
205
See Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434, 1436 (11th Cir.
1989) (Vance, J.); Lex A. Coleman, Individual Consumer "Chapter 20" Cases After Johnson: An
Introduction to Nonbusiness Serial Filings Under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9
BANKR. DEV.J. 357, 371-74 (1992).
200
In Citicorp Mortgage, Inc v. Lumpkin (In re Lumpkin), 144 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1993), the mortgagee claimed that nonrecourse mortgages could not be cured because the
debtor does not "owe" the arrearages. Judge Robert Krechevsky read Johnson to mean that the
arrearages could be cured as if the debtor really owed those amounts. See id. at 241-42.
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security agreement shouul, have been cured and reinstated under
§ 1322(b) (5), in which case the claim would not be discharged. A
good argument exists that "equity regards as done what ought to be
done. " 207 Thus, since the mortgage agreement should not have
been modified, it will be treated as if it were reinstated, in which
case, once the plan is over, the secured claim will not be discharged.
This argument, however, was rejected in In re Chappell,208 where
Judge Kenneth Ripple asserted res judicata to prevent the secured
creditor from enforcing any rights against the debtor, once the plan
had finished and the discharge was awarded. 209

G. Breach of the Reinstated Agreement
If the reinstated contract is breached, the automatic -stay may
prevent a secured creditor from foreclosing on the collateral which
secures the reinstated obligation. Thus, § 362(a) (5) prevents "any
act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent such lien secures a claim that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title." 210 Also relevant is
§ 362(a) (6), which prohibits "any act to collect, assets, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title." 211 Taken in isolation, these provisions are
quite extreme. They forever bar collection of even undischarged
debts. These provisions are much tempered, however, by § 362(c),
which governs the duration of the automatic stay. According to
§ 362(c):
Except as provided in subsections {d), (e), and (f) of this section(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under
subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no
longer property of the estate; and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this
section continues until the earliest of-

207
Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 585 F.2d 1171,
1177 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield,].).
2
•• 984 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1993).
:mn Id. at 782.
2111
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
211
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1994).
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(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed;
(C) if the case is a case under ... chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13
of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied. 212

In all of the reorganization chapters, the plan divests the estate of its
property in favor of debtors in their private capacity. 213 Hence,
§ 362(c) (1) is always met by the time a security agreement is reinstated. The end of the stay will therefore be decided by§ 362(c) (2),
which terminates the stay when the debtor is generally discharged.
Of course, the reinstated agreement is immune from discharge. The
discharge refers to the other various claims, not the reinstated security agreement. 214
In chapter 11, discharge (of unreinstated claims) is granted
when the plan is confirmed. 215 Thus, in chapter 11, if a reinstated
security agreement goes into default, the stay is no longer a consideration, unless the plan provides otherwise. 216
In chapters 12 and 13, the stay is prolonged, because chapters
12 and 13 defer discharge until that time. 217 Thus, only when the
chapter 12 or 13 plan is completed does the automatic stay lapse.
Prior to that time, a secured creditor must move for relief from the
automatic stay in order to foreclose upon the collateral.
Sections 362(a) (5) and (a) (6) refer to the collection of
prepetition claims. A reinstated security agreement, however, is reinstated postpetition in the plan. Therefore, §§ 362(a) and (a) (6) apply
only if the reinstated agreement is considered a prepetition obligation. If it is a postpetition obligation, then §§ 362(a) (5) and (6)
cannot apply. For that matter, no part of§ 362(a) applies, once the
property leaves the bankruptcy estate. Hence, the applicability of the
automatic stay to reinstated agreements during a chapter 12 or 13
plan depends on whether the agreement is viewed as prepetition or

212

11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1994).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 114l(b), 1227(b), 1327(b) (1994).
214
See supra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
21
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (d)(l)(A) (1994).
2111
See supra note 196.
217
See Hagel v. Drummond (In re Hagel), 184 B.R. 793 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995) (Meyers,].);
Allen v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. (In re Hartley), 75 B.R. 394, 397 (S.D. Ala. 1987) (Hand, J.);
In re Davis, 64 B.R. 358,359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Schwartzberg,].).
213

1997]

Rake's Progress

315

postpetition.
In In re Nicholson, 218 Judge Charles Matheson declared the reinstated agreement to be a postpetition obligation. As a result,
§§ 362(a)(5) and (6) did not protect the debtor. 219 Once the plan
was confirmed, the automatic stay utterly lapsed. For this reason,
Judge Matheson declared that a postpetition foreclosure could proceed without the secured party moving to lift the automatic stay
under § 362(d). 220 Other courts, however, find reinstated agreements to be prepetition in nature. 221 In these cases, the automatic
stay prevents unilateral action upon default of the reaffirmed agreement.
If the stay applies, then, upon breach, the secured party must
move to lift the stay. Default on the terms of the reinstated agreement then becomes grounds for this relief. 222 In contrast; res judicata prevents the secured creditor from obtaining relief from the
stay when the debtor is not in default under the plan. 223 Once the
stay is lifted, the reinstated agreement may be enforced according to
the parcels and particulars of state law.
Nevertheless, a chapter 12 or 13 debtor might prevent the lifting of the stay upon the promise to reinstate the agreement yet
again. 224 Both chapter 12 and 13 provide for liberal modification of
the plan. 225 In contrast, chapter 11 plans may not be revoked, except for fraud, and even then revocation must occur within 180 days

21

70 B.R. 398 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987).
See id. at 400.
220
See id. at 400-0 I.
221
See Far West Fed. Bank v. Vanasen (In re Vanasen), 81 B.R. 59, 60-61 (D. Or. 1987)
(Panner,J.); Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Broman (In re Broman), 82 B.R. 581,582 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1988) (Brumbaugh,].); In re Ford, 84 B.R. 40, 45 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl,J.).
222
See Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis), 60 B.R. 432, 435 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1985) (Abrahams,].); In
re Randall, 98 B.R. 916, 918-19 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (Squires, j.); In re Durben, 70 B.R. 14,
15-16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (Sellers,J.) (denying motion because breach was not material);
In re Davis, 64 B.R. 358,359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Schwartzberg,].).
22
•
See Rhode Island Cent. Credit Union v. Zimble (In re Zimble), 47 B.R. 639 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1985) (Votolato,J.).
22
•
See In re Raymond, 99 B.R. 819, 822-23 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (Cole,J.). It has been
suggested that, when a secured party moves to lift the stay because of defaults in the reinstated
agreement, adequate protection is never an issue because of res judicata. See In re Smith, 104
B.R. 695, 700 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Scholl, J.); In re Davis, 64 B.R. 358, 359-60 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Schwartzberg, J.). This would be true when there are no defaults, but, given
the defaults and given the intent to cure and reinstate the agreement yet again, the court
should insist on adequate protection between the time of the motion to lift the stay and the
time of the second reinstatement.
225
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a), 1329(a) (1994).
R
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of confirmation. 226 Hence, only chapter 12 and chapter 13 debtors
will have the opportunity to modify their plans. In Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggf,e (In re Hoggf,e), 221 Judge Lanier Anderson ruled
that modification of the plan and reinstatement of the contract a
second time did not violate the rule in § 1322(b) (2) against modifying home mortgages. Rather, just as cure under § 1322(b) (5) overrode the antimodification rule of § 1322(b) (2) the first time, it
could do so again and again. 228 Indeed, Judge Anderson explained
that any "contrary interpretation of the statutory scheme would result in a rigid default rule under which a payment tendered one day
late would result in an immediate, incurable default. "229 Judge Anderson warned that debtors who purposefully reinstated security
agreements in anticipation of multiple defaults were subject to court
discipline. 230 But, assuming no bad faith, the continuance of chapter 13 implies multiple opportunities to cure a default that occurs
after the first reinstatement. 231 Some courts insist that the debtor
show cause or changed circumstances;232 otherwise res judicata prevents the modification that is permitted in § 1329. 233 But, given
such a showing, 234 second or third reinstatements are permissible.
Some courts, however, disagree and hold that postconfirmation
modification of the plan is unavailable to cure and reinstate a previously reinstated agreement. 235 For example, courts have held that

221

See 11 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. I 994).
22
•
See id. at 1010. Judge Anderson emphasized that § 1322(b)(5), in allowing cures,
broadly refers to postpetition as well as to prepetition defaults.
220
Id. at lOll.
"'" See id. at I0ll-12.
231
Accord, Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 111 B.R. 151, 154 (W.D. Tenn. 1988)
(McRae,].); Far West Fed. Bank v. Vanasen (In re Vanasen), 81 B.R. 59 (D. Ore. 1987)
(Panner,J.); In re Bellinger, 179 B.R. 220, 223-25 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995) (Hagan,].); In re
Mannings, 47 B.R. 318, 321-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (Eisen,].). One argument against Hoggf,e
is that§ 1322(b)(5) refers to "maintenance of payments while the case is pending." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(5) (1994), see In re Smith, 179 B.R. 437, 448 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). One creditor
argued that§ l322(b) (5) becomes unavailable if payments were not made after bankruptcy-if
postpetition defaults occurred. See Smith, 179 B.R. at 448. This was rejected in In re Comans, 164
B.R. 539, 542-43 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994) (Ellington,J.).
232
See In reGadlen, 110 B.R. 341, 344-45 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Brown,].).
2
"
See In re Bereolos, 126 B.R. 313,326 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (Lindquist,].).
2
3-1 Judge Paul Lindsey has suggested that no hearing need be held on a debtor's proposal
to cure postpetition defaults on its commitment to cure prepetition defaults, unless the secured party objects. In re Steele, 182 B.R. 284, 292 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1995) (Lindsey,].).
23
'
In In re Nicholson, 70 B.R. 398 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (Matheson, J.), Judge Matheson
ruled that the automatic stay never applies to a reinstated agreement. In so ruling, he suggest;

227
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§ 1322(b) (5) requires "maintenance of payments while the case is
pending. " 236 Yet if major plan defaults have occurred, this provision of § 1322(b) (5) cannot be met. Because modification under
§ 1327(b) (1) requires that § 1322(b) (5) be met, defaults on the
reinstated agreement would therefore preclude a second reinstatement through modification. 237 This argument, however, overlooks
the fact that§ 1322(b) (5) allows cure of past defaults as well as reinstatement of payments going forward. A debtor wishing to reinstate
the security agreement a second time indeed promises to maintain
payments going forward. The past defaults are cures. "Maintenance
of payments" is always future-oriented-starting from the time the
agreement is reinstated.
Sometimes it is argued that curing postpetition defaults is not
mentioned in § 1329(a) as one of the reasons for modification. Section 1329(a) provides:
At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim, to(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims
of a particular class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose
claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take
account of any payment of such claim other than under the
plan.23s

Creditors thus protest that adding a cure claim to the plan is not
authorized by the above provl'sion. This argument has been rejected.239 Each of the subparagraphs quoted above may be fairly interpreted as describing cure.
In any case, a chapter 13 debtor could always refile a second
chapter 13 petition. In this second proceeding, the mortgage, earlier

ed that plan modifications to reinstate mortgage agreements a second time were always inappropriate. See id. at 400-01.
ejr, See supra note 231.
m See In re Sensabaugh, 88 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (Shelley,J.).
"" 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1994).
23
n See In re Mannings, 47 B.R. 318 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (Eisen,].).
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reinstated, could be reinstated once again. While sequential petitions
are generally viewed as evidence of bad faith, 240 they are not conclusively so. 241 If successive petitions are an option, there is no sense
in per se opposition to modifications of an existing chapter 13 plan.
III. CURE
And thou, too careless patient as thou art
Committ'st thy 'nointed body to the cure
Of those physicians that first wounded thee. 242

Before a debtor can reinstate a security agreement, she must
first "cure" any defaults. "Cure" is distinct from reinstatement and
can be thought of as the price the debtor must pay for the privilege
of reinstatement. Cure is retrospective while reinstatement is prospective in nature.
Each reorganization chapter encourages the "cure" of loan
agreements. 243 Prior to 1994, however, the Bankruptcy Code did
not define what this term might mean. 244 In 1994, Congress added
the following definition in new § 1123(d), "[n]otwithstanding subsection (a) of this section and sections 506(b), 1129(a) (7), and
1129(b) of this title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure a default the
amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy
law." 245 Nearly identical provisions were added to chapters 12 and
13.246 While the cross-references in the versions appended to chapters 12 and 13 are different, the effect is the same. According to
§ 1222(d) "[n]otwithstanding subsection (b) (2) of this section and
sections 506(b) and 1225(a) (5) of this title, if it is proposed in a
plan to cure a default, the amount necessary to cure the default

240
See Blatnick v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 198 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (Bowie,].); In re Herrera, 194 B.R. 178, 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (Squires,J.).
241
Seejohnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991) (Marshall,].); In mjohnson,
708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (successive chapter 13 petitions).
242
WILLIAM' SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 2, sc. 1.
24
'
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(G), 1222(b)(3), 1222(b)(5), 1322(b)(3), 1322(b)(5)
(1994).
244
See Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993) (Thomas, J.). Section 1124(2)(C) may be
relevant. See infra notes 323-38 and accompanying text.
24
"
11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994).
246
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(d), 1322(e) (1994).
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shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement
and applicable nonbankruptcy law." 247 And according to § 1322(e)
"[n]otwithstanding subsection (b)(2) of this section and sections
506(b) and 1325(a) (5) of this title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure
a default the amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined in according with the underlying agreement and applicable
non bankruptcy law. " 248 These various provisions enact a contractual theory of cure.
In defining what cure is, the 1994 amendments attempt to mediate a disagreement on the nature of cure that arose in the case law
prior to 1994. One school of thought held cure to be defined by the
state law'of contract, supplemented by local regulation. According to
Judge Kenneth Hall in Landmark Financial Services v. HaU:. 249
A mortgage cure, in a sense, occurs outside the ambit of the Code.
Any charges such as late fees may indeed be payable by the mortgagor
who elects to cure, but such charges would be mandated not by section 506(b) but, rather, because they are integral elements of the cure
.... The valuation of the claim or the collateral is simply immaterial
when the original agreement is reinstated and the debtor elects to
make all the payments called for by the agreement. The mortgagee
receives· only the interest and other charges to which it is entitled
under the agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. 250

Apparently, older security agreements (as reflected in the early case
law) tended to be silent about the consequence of monetary defaults
and the price of cure. The contract theory initially enriched debtors
with cures that undercompensated their creditors. 251 In effect, because the early contracts were silent, debtors could cure by paying
defaults on principal and interest, without providing interest compensation between the time of the default and the time at which the

247

11 U.S.C. § 1222(d) (1994).
11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (1994). For the sake of convenience, I will refer only to§ 1123(d),
but, unless otherwise indicated, everything stated about§ 1123(d) applies equally to the analogous amendments in chapters 12 and 13.
249
918 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hall,J.).
••• Id. at 1155 (citation omitted).
"' See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 944 F.2d 542, 545
(9th Cir. 1991) (Leavy, J.); Hall, 918 F.2d at 1154-5; In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. i 987)
(Stapleton, J.); In re Terry, 780 F.2d 894, 896-97 (11th Cir. 1985) (Roney, J.); In re Sanchez,
137 B.R. 214 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) (Sharp,J.); In re Small, 65 B.R. 686,689 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1986) (Scholl,J.), affd, 76 B.R. 390 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
2411
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cure price was calculated. Furthermore, in chapters 12 and 13, the
price had to be paid within "a reasonable time. " 252 Given the silence of the contract about cure, the price could be paid over time
without paying postconfirmation interest (or "cram down" interest)
to equate the present cure price with the deferred payment of the
price.253
The victory, however, was strictly Pyrrhic. Creditors soon learned
to add all sorts of penalties, default interest rates, provisions for interest on interest, and various other boilerplate tortures. Such provisions might have been supplemented or curtailed by state law. The
contract theory took for granted that local regulation would control
the contractual definition of cure. 254 In any case, the price of cure
increased as creditors learned to maximize their returns with new
clauses that tested the limits of nonbankruptcy regulation. 255
The second school held that the cure was to be governed by
§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5)-provisions that generally apply to secured claims. Hence, when the cure was added to the principal
amount still due and owing on the reinstated contract, and when the
value of the collateral exceeded this sum, the cure was an
oversecured claim. Accordingly, § 506(b) commanded that the secured party receive postpetition interest between the time of the
default and the time that the cure price was calculated. In addition,
if payment of the cure price was to be deferred over time,
§ 1325(a) (5) required that the present value of the deferred payment equal or exceed the value of the collateral. 256

"'' CJ

11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b)(5), 1322(b)(5) (1994).
""' For example, suppose the debtor had defaulted on $100 due on March 1, 1990. The
debtor had to cure this default in a plan confirmed on July I. Because the contract was silent
on what "cure" meant, the debtor could pay $100 to cure on July I even though interest would
have accrued between March and July. Furthermore, the $100 would not have had to be have
been paid in cash on July I. It could have been paid in a "reasonable time." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(5) (1994). If the contract did not require "cram down" interest, the debtor might
have gotten away with giving entitlements on July I worth less than $100. Cure was thus twice
cursed under the contract theory where the contract was silent on the terms of cure.
,,.. See Hall, 918 F.2d at 1155-56 (holding that state law applies but finding no supplement
in Virginia law).
m, Thus, one creditor's agreement awarded postdefault interest at "the highest rate permitted by law." In re Laymon, 117 B.R. 856,857 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark,J.), rev'd, 958
F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1992).
'"" See Cardinal Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119, 122
(6th Cir. 1985) (Wellford, J.). In chapter 12, this result would flow from § 1225(a) (5). This
point about cram down would not apply in chapter 11, because in chapter 11, reinstatement is
overtly an alternative tci cram down. Section 506(b) could apply to chapter 11 cures, however.
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In Rake v. Wade, 257 Justice Clarence Thomas applied § 506(b)
to establish the secured creditor's right to preconfirmation interest,
and he applied § 1325(a) (5) to establish the secured creditor's right
to postconfirmation interest. In so doing, he emphasized that
§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) are of general application and did not
expressly exclude the idea of cure from their domains. 258
Section 506(b) applies only to oversecured creditors. Therefore,
Justice Thomas left open the question whether undersecured creditors
were entitled to preconfirmation interest. Accordingly, courts fell
into immediate and unseemly disarray over the entitlement of
undersecured creditors to preconfirmation interest. Some courts
continued to assert the contract theory to supply preconfirmation
interest. 259 Others inferred that, if§ 506(b) was the operative theory of Rake v. Wade, undersecured creditors must be disentitled to
preconfirmation interest. 260
Equally problematic was Justice Thomas's reliance on
§ 1325(a) (5) to establish a creditor's right to cram down interest.
Section 1325(a) (5) requires that for a chapter 13 plan:
with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed
amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim
to such holder .... 261

This is chapter 13'~ "cram down" provision. By invoking the notion
of present value, § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii) suggests that postconfirmation
interest must be paid in order to equate the value of payments with
See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
257
508 U.S. 464 (1993).
2
•• See id. at 471-73.
2
''" See In re Hardware, 189 B.R. 273, 276-77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Duberstein,J.); cf. In
re Callahan, 158 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (Ninfo, J.) (using contract theory to
supply prepetition interest).
21
"
See In re Jones, 168 B.R. 146, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (Abel,J.).
2 11
'
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added).
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the present value of the collateral.
The emphasized language indicates that § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii)
only applies to secured claims. Because the creditor in Rake v. Wade
was oversecured, the cure price could be viewed as a "secured claim"
within the meaning of§ 1325(a) (5).
In the case of undersecured creditors, the application of
§ 1325(a) (5) was far less clear. Faced with an undersecured claim,
some courts felt compelled to allocate cure between the secured and
unsecured portions. Secured portions would be entitled to
postconfirmation interest, as required by command of
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Unsecured portions were not entitled to
postconfirmation interest. Unsecured creditors in chapter 13 are not
necessarily entitled to cram down interest-only to a distribution in
excess of what they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation. 262 Of course, reinstatement going forward would include an
interest component. On this assumption, only the undersecured
party's arrearage claim-comprised of defaults on principal and
interest-could be denied interest. 263
Under Rake v. Wade, courts had to make some sort of allocation,
in order to determine whether the cure price was a secured claim
within the meaning of§ 1325(a) (5) (B)(ii) or not. Some courts simply labelled any cure claim as per se secured within the meaning of
§ 1325(a) (5), thereby entitling it to cram down interest.264 In other

262

See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4) (1994).
For example, suppose a secured creditor claims $100 on collateral worth only $80. Of
the $100; $20 constitutes past defaults. In order to apply cram down to the requirement of
cure, a court would have to decide whether the $20 cure price was part of the secured claim
(subject to § 1325(a)(5)) or the unsecured claim (subject to the unsecured creditor cram
down rule of§ 1325 (a)( 4)). The former cram down rule has a postconfirmation interest component, because the rule is based on present value of payments, compared to the value of
collateral. The unsecured creditor's provision has no present value concept and thus no clear
requirement of cram down interest.
,,;.i See, e.g., Jones, 168 B.R. at 149; In re Casey, 159 B.R. 963, 964 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1993)
(Steele, J.); Callahan, 158 B.R. at 904. Professor Robert Lawless suggests that Nobelman redefines the "secured claim" of a home mortgagee as the entire debt, including arrearages. Accordingly,§ 1325(a) (5) would have required interest to be paid on arrearages. Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47
SYR. L. REv. 1, 69 (1996). This remark overlooks the fact that Justice Thomas preserved the
§ 506(a) meaning for "secured claim." Instead, Thomas referred to "rights" as that which
could not be modified. See Nob/,eman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110 (§ 506(a) "does not necessarily mean
that the 'rights' the bank ertjoys as a mortgagee, which are protected by § 1322(b) (2), are
limited by the valuation of its secured claim ... "). Nobelman and Rake taken together therefore required the arrearage claim to be .characterized as either secured or unsecured and gave
no guidance how this might be done.
263
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words, they applied secured creditor cram down to a claim that was
really unsecured. 265 Another possibility would split the difference.
The arrearage claim would be added to the principal amount due
under the reinstated contract; from this sum the value of the collateral would be subtracted. The difference defined the arrearage
amount not entitled to interest going forward, The balance of the
arrearage claim would be entitled to interest. 266 These allocative
difficulties with regard to undersecured claims were purely the product of Rake v. Wade's theory that made § 1325(a) (5) the basis of
postconfirmation interest.
Meanwhile, Rake v. Wade, as applied to chapter 11, meant that
only § 506(b) governed cure. Cram down could never do so, because cure and reinstatement in chapter 11 had the effect of rendering a creditor into an affirmative voter. Since reinstated creditors are
almost certainly placed in their own unique class, no reinstated creditor could assert cram down protection. Hence, unlike in chapters 12
and 13, cram down cannot provide a justification for
postconfirmation interest.
A. The 1994 Amendments
A year after Rake v. Wade, Congress made contract and
nonbankruptcy law the theme of cure. 267 In § 1123(d) and its

205
This comports with the "compensatory" theory which will be offered an an alternative
to the contractual theory and the theory based upon § 506(b) and § 1325(a)(5). See generally
infra Part IV.
266
This allocative system was modified in In re Arvelo, 176 B.R. 349 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1995)
(Wizmur, J.). In Aroelo, Judge Wizmur chose a somewhat different allocation formula: take the
value of the collateral and divide it by the sum of the arrearage claim and the reinstated claim
for principal; the resulting percentage should then be multiplied by the arrearage claim. This
amount then becomes the "secured" arrearage claim, entitled to interest going forward. The
balance was not entitled to interest. See id. at 357.
It may b.e noted that under the formula utilized by Judge Wizmur, where the collateral
was worth $85,000, the arrearage amount was $12,772, $77,767 was principal owed under reinstatement, the total combined arrearage-reinstatement claim was $90,543, the percentage of
the arrearage claim considered secured was 90.375% ($77,767/$85,000). Hence, the total secured claim was $89,313 ($77,767 ($12,776) (.90375) = $89,313). In comparison, the value of
the collateral was only $85,000.Judge Wizmur's formula therefore over-allocated the arrearage
claim to the secured portion.
Another court has ruled that the arrearage claim is unsecured, unless the creditor can
show collateral is adequate to secure all or part of it-a burden of proof allocation. See In re
Johnson, 203 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (Proctor,].)
•m Congress also established the foreclosure sale as the deadline for curing defaulted security agreements. This deadline is purely a federal rule, since state law provides diverse dead-
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analogs in chapters 12 and 13, the cure price is to be defined solely
by the contract and by whatever nonbankruptcy law constrains or
supplements the contract. 268
Congress applied this theory to agreements entered into after
the enactment of the 1994 amendments. 269 Agreements prior to
this time will continue to be governed by Rake v. Wade. 270 The prospective effect is insidious, because it guarantees that secured creditors whose security agreements antedate October 22, 1994, are entitled to the market-based compensation of Rake v. Wade. All new
agreements can provide their own cure by their own terms. 271
Thus, the old contracts will continue to obtain market-based compensation because these contracts may not have described their own
self-cure. The new contracts, however, will be permitted to spell out
what cure means. Moreover, since security agreements can last a very
long time, Rake v. Wade's interpretation of cure shall be with us for
decades to come.
The trouble with the contractual concept of cure is that chapter
11 debtors have every incentive to bargain away too much to their
secured creditors, because they know that their unsecured creditors
will ultimately pay any interest charges and fees. Therefore, one can
expect security agreements will contain lavish "cure" provisions. 272
In the dubious patois of price theory, debtors will export this cost to
others, thereby creating Pareto misallocations of resources. 273 A

lines, based on whether the debtor continued to have an interest in the collateral. See supra
text accompanying notes 167-70.
2011
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, §§ 305(a)-305(c), 108 Stat.
4106, 4134.
21
"' See id. § 702(b) (2) (D), 108 Stat. at 4150-51. This effective date impedes only
§§ 1123(d), 1222(d), and 1322(e)-the new definitions of cure. All other relevant 1994
amendments became effective to any bankruptcy case that was commenced after October 22,
1994. See supra note 15.
270
See, e.g., In re Johnson, 203 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (Proctor, J.) (applying
Rake to a case filed after 1994).
271
See Marianne B. Culhane, Home Improvement? Home Mortgages and the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 467, 494 (1996).
272
See Roger M. Whelan & Mandy S. Cohen, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Balancing the
Equities in Chapter 13, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 180 (1994).
273
See Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR.
LJ. 551, 558-59 (1995).Judge Ralph Meskill assumes that debtor.rnbtain value from agreeing to
pro-creditor covenants about attorneys' fees; see also United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, (In re United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc.), 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982).
Economically, this may be so. Since the debtor controls access to the ability to transfer wealth
from the unsecured to the secured creditor, the debtor, in a competitive credit market, would
be able to capture these rents for herself.

~
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market-based notion of compensation would have prevented these
abuses, since the contract would have been irrelevant in setting the
cure amount, beyond establishing the times when payments would
have been due.
The 1991, amendments permit contractual governance of the
right to cure. Could the contract provide that it may not be cured
and reinstated at all? If so, state law would then control the important question of bankruptcy jurisdiction over home mortgages and
other security agreements. Yet such a contract clause would be tantamount to an ipso facto clause, elsewhere rendered illegal in bankruptcy.274 Secured creditors could then, in essence, have ipso facto
rights in violation of this general principle.
Federal bankruptcy courts must honor contractual cure provisions, but they must not permit ipso facto clauses in the contract. To
reconcile this contradiction, the idea of cure must have a federal
component which yields to, but is not obliterated by, local law. Thus,
§ 1123(d) refer~ to the positive right to cure, indicating that the
price of the cure will be determined by contract and local law. 275 If
the contract and nonbankruptcy law set an unreasonable price, a
court could declare the price to be a penalty or an ipso facto contract-not a cure at all. 276 In other words, courts can be expected
to insist that "cure" have a compensatory essence. When a contract
clause or nonbankruptcy regulation is within the domain of cure,
the federal courts might defer to these sources. But federal law
should not allow the contract to smuggle in a penalty in the name of
cure. Imposing penalties in the name of cure is precisely the kind of
ipso facto intervention that federal law prohibits.
Cure, then, must be fundamentally compensatory, not punitive
or opportunistic. The secret message of the 1994 amendments, then,
is that the contract can only be evidence of what constitutes compensation to the secured creditor for past defaults. The contract can
never be applied without deciding that the contract is in fact credible evidence of what constitutes market-based compensation.

This critique does not work so well for chapter 12 and 13 debtors. Here, the debtor-not the unsecured creditors--pays the tab. Hence, a rational debtor has the incentive to
resist lavish cure provisions.
214
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(l), 541(c)(l) (1994).
275
See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994).
276
See In re Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 B.R. 558, 561-62 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1983) (Proctor,].) (excluding "penalty" late charges from the cure price).
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B. E/,ements of Cure
According to the covert compensatory theme of cure that has
just been developed, the cure price will be set by four factors: ( 1)
breach of the promise to pay principal at set times, (2) breach of
the promise to pay interest at set times; (3) attorneys' fees, costs and
charges (whether or not provided for in the contract); and (4) interest running from the time of breach to the time the price is calculated-that is to say, "preconfirmation interest."

I. Principal
Prior to 1994, only the first of these items - principal - was
incontrovertibly conceded to be part of cure.277 Thus, in Sapos v.
Provident Institution of Savings, 278 the debtor wished to bifurcate a
home mortgage into its secured and unsecured parts, with the debtor paying the secured claim at the contractual rate. 279 Judge
Ruggiero Aldisert ruled that the bifurcation was permissible.280
The debtor proposed to make the payments on the secured
claim serve a double purpose. First, the payment would satisfy the
reinstated claim going forward. Second, the same payment would
satisfy the backward looking cure of past defaults. 2111 According to
the debtor, when the secured claim was paid, the mortgage agree:ment was automatically cured. 2112 Indeed, thanks to this double-dip,
the debtor's proposed plan in effect excused the debtor from paying
any cure price at all, so long as the secured claim was eventually
paid. Judge Aldisert ruled that such a plan could not be confirmed.
Rather, the cure price had to be distinguished in the plan from the
secured claim. 2113 Each had to be paid separately. In effect, arrears
were assumed to be the unsecured deficit which nevertheless had to

277
As any student of bankruptcy knows, there is always a case that gets in. the way of claiming that a "universal" principle of law exists. Thus, in In re Hunt, 140 B.R. 333 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1992), Judge Alan Shiff excused the cure of postpetition defaults altogether. As a result,
the debtor had to cure prepetition defaults and had to reinstate the mortgage from the time
of confirmation. Missed payments in the interim were simply forgiven. &e id. at 336.
2
'" 967 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1992) (Aldisert,J.).
279
See id. at 926-27. This bifurcation was precisely what the Supreme Court ruled illegal in
Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (Thomas,J.), nearly one year later.
2
"° See id. at 929.
2HI See id. at 923.
2 2
•
See id.
2
"" See id. at 926-27.
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be paid in, full. As a result, payment of arrears could transform an
undersecured creditor into an oversecured one. For example, if the
secured party claimed $100 against collateral worth only $80, a cure
price of $25 would reduce the total claim to $75, rendering the
secured party oversecured. 284

2. Precon.firmation Interest
Rake v. Wade 2115 is an interpretation of§ 506(b). As such, it im-

plies that the market rate of interest is the appropriate choice of a
rate for § 506(b). 286 This was because the contract itself in Rake was
silent as to whether the debtor had to pay interest on interest in
case of default. In deciding for the market rate of interest, Justice
Thomas cited United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 287 which held
that involuntary lien creditors were entitled to interest under
§ 506(b) if they were oversecured, even though no contract existed
at all. That is, § 506(b) establishes a noncontractual right to interest
on all amounts past due, including interest payments past due. 288

'"' AccUTd, Brown v. Shorewood Fin., Inc. (In re Brown), 175 B.R. 129, 133-34 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1994) (Feeney, ].). But see In re Cruz, 152 B.R. 866, 868 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(Schwartzberg,].); In re Terranova, 152 B.R. 20, 24 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (Shiff,J.).
As a result of Rake v. Wades reliance upon § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii) to establish the right to
cram down interest, courts had to allocate the cure price between the secured and the unsecured part of the debt. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text. The allocation in Sapos
simply establishes that payment of principal does not simultaneously constitute payment of the
cure price.
'"" 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].).
,.,; See Dean Pawlowic, l!.ntitlement to Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J.
149, 160 (1995) (so interpreting Rake). But see In re Cureton, 163 B.R. 494, 495 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1994) (Spector,].) (reading Rake to mean that the market rate for cures should be used
only where the contract does not specifically govem).Judge Spector's reading is based on the
idea that § 1322(b) (2) prevents modification of the contract, but he overlooks the fact that
§ 1325(b)(5) allows for cures "notwithstanding" § 1322(b)(2). Hence, Rake did not merely
invoke the market rate in the absence of a contractual cure provision. It simply applied ordinary standards from§ 506(b) and cram down.
For a post-Rake case blithely ruling that § 506(b) requires any arrearage claim to receive
contract interest, see In re Harris, 167 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (Bishop,].). This case also
holds that cram down interest need not be paid on any arrearage claim that includes defaults
on interest, because that would be interest on interest. See id. at 815.
1
"
Rake, 503 U.S. at 467-8 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235
(1989) (Blackmun,J.)).
2
"" Section 506(b) provides that, to the extent there is an equity cushion, "there shall be
allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose." 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)
(1994). Notice that, according to§ 506(b), the contract governs for fees and costs. Thus, if the
contract does not provide for costs, they cannot be awarded. It is impossible, however, to tell
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Although Rake v. Wade has been overruled for cure, this holding
should continue to be good law for the meaning of § 506(b) in
noncure cases. Congress did not overrule Rake v. Wade insofar as it
governs noncure situations.
After 1994, cure, newly defined by§ 1123(d), is "notwithstanding" § 506 (b), and according to the contract. Thus, the law of cure
and the law of the oversecured creditor are now entirely divorced,
although a great many courts continue to apply the contract rate of
interest for§ 506(b), in spite of Rake v. Wade. 289
Under any of the theories operating prior to 1994, an
oversecured creditor and perhaps even an undersecured creditor
could have obtained postpetition interest on the amount of default
as part of the cure. The cure price then includes the dollar amounts
of interest that should have been paid under the contract. If, in
addition, an interest component is added to reflect the fact that
time had passed between the default and the calculation of the cure
price, then cure represents, in part, interest on interest.
Interest on interest begins an infinite regress that inflames the
ire of equity. In the pre-Code case of Vanston Bondholders Protective
Committee v. Green, 290 interest on interest was declared inequitable
as a matter of federal law. In Vanston, a secured debenture called for
periodic interest payments. If the debtor were to default on these

whether the contract also governs on the rate of interest a secured party may collect. The
placement of the comma after "interest on such claim" is ambiguous. The comma separates
the right to interest from the existence of a contract.
In Ron Pair.Justice Harry Blackmun rested heavily on this fatal comma in ruling that the
contract is irrelevant to an oversecured creditor's right to postpetition interest. See Ron Pair,
489 U.S. at 241-42. This ruling affirmed the entitlement of statutory lienors to postpetition
interest, when such lienors have no contractual relation with the debtor. According to Justice
Blackmun:
The phrase "interest on such claim" is set aside by commas and separated from the
reference to fees, costs, and charges by the conjunctive words "and any." As a result,
the phrase "interest on such claim" stands independent of the language that follows.
"Interest on such claim" is not part of the list made up of "fees, costs, or charges,"
nor is it joined to the following clause so that the final "provided for under the
agreement" modifies it as well. The language and punctuation Congress used cannot
be read in any other way. By the plain language of the statute, the two types of recovery are distinct.
Id. at 242 (citation omitted). In other words, the right to interest is unconnected to the contract,
and from this it follows that the contract rate need not be used, even if there is a contract. The
proper rate of interest is open to choice.
9
'"
See, e.g., Bradford v. Crozier (In re Laymon), 958 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1992)
(Thornberry,].).
2110
329 U.S. 156 (1946).
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payments, the debenture called for interest on interest. 291 The lower courts decided that New York law should decide whether interest
on interest could be added to the secured claim. But they disagreed
as to what New York law was. The District Court found that New
York law permitted, while the Court of Appeals found that it prohibited, interest on interest. 292
Justice Hugo Black decided that a federal rule of equity prohibited interest on interest. He emphasized that interest on interest is a
penalty-not compensation. 293 Since bankruptcy delay is a fortuity
imposed by law, Justice Black reasoned that creditors with favorable
contracts should not obtain interest on interest at the expense of
creditors whose contracts have no such provision. 294 This ground is
not entirely satisfactory. Justice Black also admitted that oversecured
creditors were entitled to straight interest at the expense of unsecured or undersecured creditors; 295 Straight interest allowed
oversecured creditors to do precisely what Justice Black thought was
inequitable with regard to compound interest, albeit at a lesser level.
Given the exception for straight interest (as governed by the contract), a prohibition on contractual interest on interest seems arbitrary.296
Rake v. Wade 297 obviously interleres with this conclusion. In
Rake, Justice Clarence Thomas reasoned that cure and reinstatement
had to be reconciled with various other portions of the Bankruptcy
Code, such as §§ 506(b) and 1325(a) (5). 298 Part of the cure price
represented defaults on interest past due. 299 Justice Thomas noted
that the secured creditor was entitled to interest, even if the contract
was silent on the matter. Hence, he found that the right to interest
on interest (for an oversecured creditor) is automatic, even if the

11
"292

See id. at 159.
See id. at 160. New York has since reversed itself and acquiesced to interest on interest.
See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW§ 5-527 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (enacted June 1989).
"'" See Vanston, 329 U.S. at 166.
14
"See id.
29
'
See id. at 164.
16
"Interestingly, Justice Black justified his decision on the ground that it would avoid intractable controversy over choice of law. See id. at 162. Ironically, the 1994 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code opt for state law in calculating the cure price, thereby reimposing the necessity for choice of law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994).
297
508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].).
"''" See id. at 468-69.
21
"' See id. at 475 n.12.
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loan agreement is silent on the matter. 300 In contrast, Vanston concerned a contract that specifically called for interest on interest,
which the Supreme Court refused to enforce. 301 It is safe to say
that Vanston is overruled by Rake v. Wade. 302
Rake v. Wades reliance on§ 506(b) has clearly been repealed in
the 1994 amendments, at least insofar as cure is concerned. Specifically, § 1123(d) and its analogs provide for a contractual cure notwithstanding§ 506(b). Hence, if the contract does not call expressly
for interest on interest, the cure price will be calculated free and
clear of any such interest. 303 But what if the contract does call for
interest on interest? After 1994, may courts, citing Vanston, still refuse to award interest on interest?
There is some evidence in the legislative history that Vanston is
dead. According to Congressman Jack Brooks,§ 1123(d) is supposed
to overrule Rake v. Wade. 304 Brooks's complaint about that case,
however, was very limited. He did not oppose Rake because of interest on interest. He only opposed it when local law prohibited interest on interest. When state law blessed compound interest, Congress
was all for it. 305 In short, Congressman Brooks (or at· least his aidesde-camp) saw the 1994 amendments as directly overruling
Vanston. 306 However, the contract must call for interest on interest,

""" See id. at 475.
'"" See Vanston, 329 U.S. at 160.
""" In Equitabk Life Assurance Society v. Subktt (In re Subktt), 895 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir.
1990), Judge Frank Johnson ruled that Vanston was likewise overruled in § 506(b), because

contractual interest on interest can be equated with "fees, costs, or charges" within the
meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 506(b). In light of§ 506(b)'s sanctification of the loan contract in this regard, Johnson thought that Vanston must be considered overruled. See id. at
1385-86; see al.so In re Martindale, 125 B.R. 32, 37 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (Pappas,J.) (allowing
interest on interest because debtors "cite to the (c]ourt no authority which would allow the
[c]ourt to simply disregard these otherwise valid contractual provisions"). However, it must be
said in Vanston's favor that fees, costs, or charges must be reasonabk. Vanston amounts to a
holding that interest on interest is "not reasonable." Hence, just because the contract is validated with regard to fees, costs, or charges does not necessarily prove that Vanston is overruled.
"" One commentator points out that, if a creditor bargains to receive principal or interest
at a certain time, part of the contract is actually to receive such payment in order to have the
reinvestment opportunity. Accordingly, interest on arrears is ordinary contract damages and
always part of the contract. See Jonathan S. Fields, Note, Taking Interest in a Cure: Compensation
for Time Value of Chapter 13 Residential Mortgage Arrears, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 2ll9 (1992).
"°4 See 140 CONG. REc. Hl0752, Hl0770 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Brooks).
""'' See id.
son Kenneth Klee calls for a clarifying amendment to prevent any charge of interest on
interest, because he (wrongly) supposes that the statute fails to conform to congressional in-

1997]

Rake's Progress

331

in case of defaults on interest past due, and state law must validate
such a contract.

3. Interest on the Accekrated Debt
It has been suggested that once a loan agreement has been
accelerated because a debtor has missed a few installments, interest
should be awarded between the time of default and the time of cure
not on the missed installments, but on the full accelerated
amount. 307 In fact, this is not a meaningful question because interest is always due and owing on principal. In other words, interest on
missed installments is the same as interest on accelerated principal
plus installments, as the following example proves.
Take a very simple $1 million loan due in five years. Interest is
at 12% per annum or 1% per month-$10,000 of interest is payable
monthly. Suppose the debtor misses two installments of interest, and
as the third becomes due, files files for bankruptcy. The debtor then
immediately seeks to cure and reinstate the loan agreement. It is
clear that the debtor must pay the two missed $10,000 payments. Let
us assume that interest of 12% per annum (interest on interest) is
owed on those installments. For the first installment, $10,000 plus
two months of interest is $10,201.00 ($10,000 x 1.012). For the second installment, the debtor owes $10,100 ($10,000 x 1.01). Finally,
the third, installment of $10,000 is presently due. No interest has
accrued for this installment. The cure price is therefore $30,301.
Suppose now that we treat the entire $1 million loan as accelerated, with interest accruing on this whole sum for three months. At
the end of three months, the debtor owes $1,030,301 ($1 million x
1.013). Since reinstatement excuses the debtor from paying accelerated principal (and no regularly scheduled principal is due), the cure
price is $30,301. This is the exact same amount due when only interest on missed installments was charged. Therefore, interest on accelerated amounts is precisely identical to compound interest on accelerated principal showing acceleration has no effect on the amount
of interest due and owing.

tent. See Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ.
551, 557-58 (1995).
"°7 See In re Arlington Village Partners, Ltd., 66 B.R. 308, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986)
(Waldron, J.); In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 43 B.R. 293, 299 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(Lifland,].), rev'd on other grounds, 60 B.R. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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4. Default Rates of Interest

In response to the contract theory of cure, modem secured
creditors have learned to demand higher postdefault interest rates.
& unsecured creditors must pay the price, debtors are apparently
quite ready to agree to higher postdefault interest rates. Reinstatement of the security agreement reestablishes the predefault status
quo, thereby allowing for the predefault rate going foiward. But
what of the cure price, which is retroactively calculated? The 1994
amendments invoke a contractual theory raising the question: must
the cure be accomplished at the higher postdefault rate?
In chapters 12 and 13, there is no restraint on what secured
creditors can demand by way of cure, save what local law prevents,
and save for the "core" federal notion that penalty clauses must not
be honored. In chapter 11, the 1994 amendments add a confusing
new provision which may have an impact upon a debtor's obligation
to pay higher postdefault rates, at least with regard to the cure. According to new§ 365(b) (2) (D), cure of executory contracts does not
require "the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a
default arising from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations, under the executory contract or unexpired
lease." 308 This section was incorporated by reference into
§ 1124(2) (A), which requires the cure of any default other than "a
kind specified in section section 365(b) (2) ... "309
The meaning of this amendment is that postdefault rates are
not part of cure, provided the debtor's defaults were nonmonetary.
From ·this rule, one might infer that the slightest monetary default
triggers the postdefault interest hike, at the expense of the unsecured creditors. This is an irrational distinction, yet one that arguably may be inferred from the 1994 amendments. Meanwhile, where
§ 1124(2) (A) contains a direct reference to § 365(b) (2) (D), the
chapter 12 and 13 analogs do not. Hence, courts will have to decide
whether cure is accomplished according to the contractual
postdefault rate or the predefault rate. & § 1222(d) and § 1322(e)
· invoke the contract and nonbankruptcy law, postdefault rates arguably may now be imposed as part of the cure price.
Prior to 1994, courts often ruled that the cure price could be
""" 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2)(0) (1994).
09
,
11 u.s.c. § 1124(2) (A) (1994).
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calculated by paying predefault rates. Thus, in Florida Partners Corp.
v. Southeast Co. (In re Southeast Co.),310 Judge Mary Schroeder held
that cure can be accomplished at the predefault rate, even though
the contract calls for the postdefault rate. According to Judge
Schroeder "[t]o allow pre-petition interest at the post-default rate
would completely eliminate the benefits of cure in this case, as it
would fail to nullify a significant consequence of default. " 311
Here are terms unsquared, which seem hyperboles. 312
Postdefault rates would result in a higher cure price, which helps the
secured creditor at the expense of the unsecured creditors, but by
no means would a higher price "completely eliminate the benefits of
cure. " 313 Indeed, if Judge Schroeder saw herself as following the
"contractual" school of cure, it must be admitted that the contract
calls for the higher rate at any time after default. While reinstatement
might be based on reestablishing the predefault interest rate contrary to the contract, cure under the contractual school is not authorized to override the contract. Hence, there is a noncontractual,
compensatory principle loose in Judge Schroeder's opinion. 314
Pretending the contract is not in default (when it is) and thereby invoking the predefault rate in violation of the contract cannot
be called a contractual theory of cure. Indeed, subjunctive work of
this sort (reimagining the world "as if' the contract were never
breached) threatens to produce a cure price of zero. That is, if we
can pretend the debtor never defaulted for the purpose of triggering postdefault interest, we can pretend no default for other reasons
as well. Namely, we can pretend that the secured party was paid all
amounts due and owing under the contract, plus attorneys' fees. If
we unleash subjunctive imagination, there is no limit, save that
which imagination chooses to impose upon itself, in reordering the

310

868 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989) (Schroder,].).
"' Id. at 339.
312
"When he speaks, 'Tis like a chime a-mending; with terms unsquared, Which from the
tongue of roaring Typhon dropp'd Would seem hyperboles." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
TRAGEDY OF TROILUS AND CRESSIDA Act 1 Sc.3.
313
In re Southeast, 868 F.2d at 339.
314
In Casa Blanca Lenders, L.P. v. City Commerce Bank (In re Casa Blanca Lenders, L.P.), 196
B.R. 140 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996),Judge Sidney Volinn held that the default rate was inappropriately charged. The lower court held that the 1994 amendments overruled In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988) (Snedd,J.) (the case upon which the decision
in Southeast was based) but judge Volinn said only that the 1994 amendments did not apply to
cases filed before the effective date of the 1994 amendment. See Casa Blanca Lenders, 196 B.R.
at 147.
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contractual rights of the parties.
Reimagining the world and then proclaiming that the contract
is not in default does not constitute following the contract. In enacting the 1994 amendments, Congress has decreed that the cure must
occur according to the contract, and hence interest must accrue at
postdefault rates. Nevertheless, it is still true that the contract must
describe a "cure," not a penalty. If the contract describes a penalty,
courts are not obliged to follow the contract.

5. Fees, Costs, and Charges
Prior to 1994, many courts held that attorneys' fees and the like
must also be paid as part of cure. 315 These cases were, in part, overruled by Rake v. Wade, 316 which implied that § 506(b) was the basis
of the conclusion that cure included postpetition interest. If an
equity cushion was necessary for postpetition interest, it is likewise
necessary for postpetition "fees, costs, or charges. "317
After 1994, even undersecured creditors may obtain postpetition
fees, costs, and charges, provided they are sanctioned by the contract
and by applicable nonbankruptcy law. Yet the 1994 amendments
introduce some ironies. Oversecured creditors whose security agreement are not reinstated are entitled only to "reasonable" fees, costs,
and charges. 318 "Reasonable," in the context of oversecured creditors, has taken on a federal meaning. 319 Courts are rigorous in scru-

''" See II U.S.C. § 1124(2) (A) (1994) (cure applies to "any such default that occurred
before or after the commencement of the case under this title ... "); see also, e.g., Green Tree
Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggle (In re Hoggle), 12 F.3d 1008, 1010 (11th Cir. 1994) (Anderson,].);
In re Hardware, 189 B.R. 273 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Duberstein,J.); In re Henson, 182 B.R.
588 (Bankr. N.D. Okla 1995) (Wilson, J.) (so holding but reducing the fee to a reasonable
amount); Vitelli v. Cheltenham Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n (In re Vitelli), 93 B.R. 889, 894-95
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl, J.). Earlier, Judge David Scholl ruled that only prepetition
attorneys' fees had to be paid as part of cure, unless § 506(b) applied. Jackson v. Boulevard
Co. (In re Nickleberry), 76 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). In Vitelli, however, he regretted his
Nickkberry conclusion. Vitelli, 93 B.R. at 894.
3111
508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].).
317
11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
"" Id.
319
See Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc., (In re K.E.
Stephenson Supply Co.) 768 F.2d 580, 585 (4th Cir. 1985) (Ervin, J.); In re Record Enters.,
Ltd., 189 B.R. 769 (D. Neb. 1986) (Beam,J.) (fee in violation of Nebraska law awarded); In re
Berry Estates, Inc., 47 B.R. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Schwartzberg,].); Longwell v. Banco
Mortgage Co., 38 B.R. 709, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Hyer, 171 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994) (Koger,].); In re Saunders, 130 B.R. 208, 211-13 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991) (Anderson,
J.) (strongly stating that attorneys' fees could be allowed under federal law, but not actually
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tinizing security agreements for reasonableness, in order to prevent
secured creditors from taxing the unsecured creditors. Yet, unless
cure has a covert federal compensatory soul,320 a reinstated security
agreement is free to be unreasonable, so long as nonbankruptcy law
approves. Fortunately, the contract and state law govern only when
cure is provided for. An unreasonabl,e fee, cost, or charge can be
viewed as a penalty, not a cure. If this premise is accepted, even after
1994, courts may ignore any contract that sets up a penalty in lieu of
a cure.
Another irony in the 1994 amendments is that a great many
courts have ruled that, even if local law prevents fees, costs, and
charges from being charged, oversecured creditors under § 506(b)
are entitled to the enforcement of their contract as a matter of federal law. 321 That is, § 506(b) sets up a federal law of contract separate and apart from local regulation. New § 1123(d), however, establishes the suzerainty of nonbankruptcy law. Hence, reinstated
oversecured parties could lose the right to an attorneys' fee that
§ 506(b) otherwise would have granted, where local law is hostile.322

finding that attorneys' fees violated state law); In re Campbell, 138 B.R. 184 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1991) (Calhoun, J.) (secured creditor could collect attorneys' fees under contract that was
contrary to Ohio law); Schlect v. Alaska (In re Schlect), 36 B.R. 236, 238-41 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1983) (Williams, J.); In re American Metals Corp., 31 B.R. 229, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)
(Franklin, J.); see also David Gray Carlson, Oversecured Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section
506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR. DEV. J.
381, 407-10 (1990) (criticizing this development).
0
"
See Citicorp Savs. v. Oliver (In re Oliver), 183 B.R. 87, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995)
(Bentz, J.) (suggesting that the federal rule of reasonableness in § 506(b) still applies when a
debtor wishes to cure and reinstate the claim of an oversecured creditor).
"' See Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir.
1986) (Goodwin, J.); Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc.
(In re K.E. Stephenson Supply Co.), 768 F.2d 580, 585 (4th Cir. 1985) (Ervin,J.).
322
Georgia has an unusual provision which allows creditors to add up to 15% to the principal amount as an attorneys' fee. This sum is owed to the lender, not to any attorney. Furthermore, in order to collect the premium:
The holder of the note ... shall, after maturity ... notify in writing the maker ...
that such maker has ten days . . . to pay the principal and interest without the
attorneys' fees. If the maker ... shall pay the principal and interest in full before
the expiration of such time, then the obligation to pay the attorneys' fees shall be
void ...
GA. CODE ANN. § 13-l-ll(a)(3) (1994). It has been held that cure and reinstatement relieves
the debtor from having to pay the 15% premium, because cure and reinstatement authorizes a
subjunctive calculation of the cure price that assumes no defaults had occurred. See In re
Centre Court Apts., Ltd., 85 B.R. 651, 656-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (Bihany,J.).
Centre Cmtrt involved a very peculiar chapter 11 plan. The debtor proposed to reinstate
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6. Reliance Damages
Under§ 506(b), if the contract does not call for "fees, costs, or
charges," then an oversecured party has no right to them if they
accrue after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Does cure follow the
same principle?
The 1994 amendments indicate that§ 506(b) no longer governs
the cure. Only the contract does. Hence, it is likely that in chapters
12 and 13, the contract had better provide for the payment of
attorneys' fees if the secured creditor is to collect them in the name
of cure. But chapter 11 has a different rule. Whereas § 1124(2) (A)
requires the debtor to cure prepetition and postpetition defaults,
§ 1124(2)(C) requires the debtor to compensate a creditor "for any
damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance by such
holder on such contractual provision or such applicable law. " 323
The phrase "damages," standing over against "cure" in§ 1124(2)(A),
must mean positive damages in excess of the cure amount. 324 The
phrase "reliance damages" implies that this provision covers noncontractual damages. Thus, if§ 506(b) requires that an agreement provide
for the payment of attorneys' fees, § 1124(2) (C) could be read as
providing for reimbursement when, in "reliance" on a breach of
contract, the creditor incurs collection expense. 325
future payments on the mortgage, but also proposed to sell the collateral free and clear of the
mortgage and pay cash proceeds to the mortgagee. Unless the debtor had a contractual right
to prepay, such a sale would appear to be inconsistent with reinstatement. See In re Newton,
161 B.R.. 207, 216-17 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (Kishel, J.) (chapter 13) (so acknowledging but
suggesting that payment of a claim under § 1322(b) (8) was not inconsistent with the rule
against modifying home mortgages under the right conditions).
In any case, the secured party never objected to the sale-only to the failure of the debtor to pay the 15% fee. In relieving the debtor of this obligation, Judge Joyce Bihary remarked
that "[t]he result might be different if the debtor had proposed a plan to sell the property
without a cure and reinstatement, since requiring the creditor to wait until a sale was consummated might have resulted in an impairment under§ 1124." Id. at 659. Had the secured party
also objected that the sale free and clear was itself an impairment, the secured party might
have won the 15% premium.
Judge Bihary also invited the secured party to seek attorneys' fees under § 506(b)-but
only for the reasonable value of services rendered. The percentage required by the contract
was held to be "unreasonable." Id. at 660-61. After 1994, cure and reinstatement would, of
course, preclude the application of any§ 506(b) rules.
"' 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (C) (1994).
324
See In re Arlington Village Partners, Ltd., 66 B.R. 308, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986)
(Waldron, J.); In re Rolling Green Country Club, 26 B.R. 729, 733 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982)
(Owens, J.).
"'' See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 316 ("Damages would include actual expenses
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Meanwhile, "reliance" suggests more than mere passivity. A
creditor who fails to obtain payment has obviously suffered a loss,
but not a reliance loss. Although "reliance damages" has been
thought to include amounts due and owing under the contract,326
what of the opportunity cost a creditor suffers, representing the
return on reinvested money? Does a creditor "rely" in any sense of
the word when the creditor is unable to reinvest? 327 In other words,
doing nothing is not reliance, but interest is necessary to provide full
compensation. Yet since § 1124(2)(C) requires compensation for
reliance, mere want of compensation is not enough to invoke the
authority of that provision. 328
In spite of these observations, courts have cited § 1124(2)(C) as
proof that chapter 11 creditors deserve interest on all arearages,
including interest on defaulted interest. 329 This interest is not to be
a creditor's actual opportunity cost; this would be too speculative330
and inconsistent with the spirit of cure, which locks the creditor into
the existing bargain. 331 Instead, some sort of interest rate must be
assigned as part of the cure price. 332

incurred by creditors pursuing their right to accelerate such as attorney's fees expended in a
foreclosure action.").
326
See In re Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983)
(Proctor,].).
27
'
Professor Walter Blum thought a positive or negative answer was equally plausible:
To qualify for compensation, a creditor presumably must show that he suffered damages from engaging in some course of conduct on the assumption that payment of
the debt would be accelerated as a result of a default. Yet it is not implausible to
interpret the statute as covering interest on an arrearage. Were an acceleration permitted, the creditor would receive payment of the debt and then be in a position to
invest those funds at interest and to earn interest on that interest. Everyone who
invests in interest-bearing securities, it can be assumed, anticipates being able to
engage in such additional investment and hence can be considered to have relied
on that opportunity. To ignore the value of a compound interest opportunity is to
deny the creditor compensation for damages that go to the very essence of his investment.
Walter J. Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations in Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 437 (1984).
"" See In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 43 B.R. 293, 301-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(Lifland, J.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Manville Forest
Prods. Corp. (In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp.), 60 B.R. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
329
See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. (In re Entz-White
Lumber & Supply, Inc.), 850 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988) (Sneed, J.); Arlington Village
Partners, 66 B.R. at 315-17.
"" See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 316.
"' See ManviUe Forest Prods., 43 B.R. at 303.
332
See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 319 (market rate, but predefault contract rate
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Section 1124(2) (C) has been read to require interest on interest, even when local state law does not permit it. Thus, if interest
can pass as "reliance" damages, which is questionable, interest on
interest is surely allowed, because § 1124(2) (C) is a federal principle
that overrides state law. 333
It has been held that reliance damages do not include the difference between the present value of the loan at a low contract rate
loan and the present value of a higher market rate loan. Such an
award defeats the entire purpose of reinstatement-capturing the
low contract rate for the benefit of a debtor's creditors. 334
Courts sometimes assume that damages under § 1124(2) (C)
refer only to prepetition damages, 335 even while § 1124(2) (A) requires cure of "any such default that occurred before or after the
commencement of the case .... "336 This assumption comes from a
sole reference in the legislative history of § 1124(2) (C), wherein
Congressman Jim Edwards remarks, "[A] class of claims is not im•
paired under the c.ircumstances of§ 1124(2) if damages are paid to
rectify reasonable reliance engaged in by the holder of a claim . . .
arising from the prepetition breach of contractual provision, such as
an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause, or law." 337 This is surely a casual or careless remark. There is no evidenc.e that Congressman Edwards (or his staff, who undoubtedly wrote this line) specifically
intended to exclude postpetition reliance. If the idea of cure is to
render the reinstated creditor whole, what is. the sense of making

was to be a minimum and postdefault contract rate was to be a maximum); see also Florida
Partners Corp. v. Southeast Co. (In re Southeast Co.), 868 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Schroeder,].) ("reliance damage ... 'does not comprise contractual penalty interest rates'")
(quoting In re Southeast Co., 81 B.R. 587, 592 (BA.P. 9th Cir 1987) (per curiam), afj'd, 868
F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989)).
'"" See Manville Forest Prods., 43 B.R. 293 (refusing to award interest on interest on the
strength of Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946)). Judge Richard Owen reversed, holding that interest on interest was indeed equitable. See Unsecured
Creditors Comm. v. Manville Forest Prods. Corp. (In re Manville Forest Prods.), 60 B.R. 403,
404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Owen, J.). It is mystifying that Owen cited Vanston for this proposition.
See id. at 404-05. A subsequent authority has theorized that the equity of interest on interest
depended upon the solvent nature of the debtor in Manvil/,e. See In re 360 Inns, Inc., 76 B.R.
573,583 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (Houston,].).
4
"
See In re Rainbow Forest Apts., 33 B.R. 576 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (Kahn, J.); In re
Rolling Green Country Club, 26 B.R. 729, 733 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (Owens,].).
''" See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 31!:i-16; In re Tavern Motor Inn, Inc., 56 B.R.
449, 452 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (Conrad,].).
»n 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (A) (1994) (emphasis added).
m 124 CONG. REc. H32406 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
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this distinction? The cure price everywhere transcends the distinction between prepetition and postpetition matters, and it should do
so with regard to "reliance damages" under § 1124(2) (C). In any
case, if§ 1124(2) (C) is read to provide that noncontractual damages
for attorneys' fees are limited to prepetition fees, it still remains true
that, where the contract expressly requires the debtor to pay
postpetition attorneys' fees, postpetition defaults in violation of such
a contract must be cured under§ 1124(2) (A). 338
C. Deferred Payment

The preceding discussion has established the elements of the
cure price-the price that must be paid to reinstate a contract. But
when must the price be paid? It does not necessarily follow that the
cure price must be paid in cash on the effective date of a reorganization plan. At least in chapters 12 and 13, the claim might be paid
over time. If so, the question arises as to whether deferred payment
implies "cram down" (i.e., postconfirmation) interest so that the
present value of the stream of payments precisely equals the present
payment for which it is a substitute.
1. Chapter 11
Chapter 11 declines to give advice as to the time by which the
cure must be accomplished, except that § 1124's preamble does
indicate that "the plan" must accomplish the cure. 339 This leaves
open the possibility that the cure amount could be paid over time.
Some courts have insisted that cure be accomplished by the
effective date of the chapter 11 plan-not stretched out over
time. 340 It has been suggested that cure on the effective date of the
plan saves litigation and avoids implication into matters of valuation. 341 One of the justifications for permitting cure and reinstate-

''" In declaring that§ 1124(2)(C) covers only prepetition reliance damages,Judge Francis
Conrad suggested that postpetition interest could be awarded under§ 506(b). See Tavern Motor
Inn, 56 B.R. at 453. This suggests that, in chapter 11, postpetition interest is not part of the
cure price when the creditor is undersecured. After 1994, however, the cure price is supposed
to be calculated "notwithstanding"§ 506(b). 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994).
339
11 u.s.c. § 1124 (1994).
340
See In re Holthoff, 58 B.R. 216, 219 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985) (Mixon,].); cf 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(b)(l)(A) (1994) (at the time of assumption of an executory contract, the trustee must
cure or give adequate assurance of a prompt cure).
341
See In re Jones, 32 B.R. 951 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (Clark,].).
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ment had been to avoid the valuations inherent in cram down hearings.342 Yet, in opposition to this point, the only valuation needed
in deferring payment of the cure amount is setting the cram down
interest rate. Precisely the same valuation issue would have been
required in deriving the cure amount, as it existed prior to the 1994
amendments.
If chapter 11 is opaque as to whether cures may be paid by
deferred payments, chapters 12 and 13 are not. They specifically
provide for payment over a "reasonable time." 343 This comparison
suggests by negative pregnant that, with regard to chapter 11, Congress intended for immediate payment on the effective date of the
plan.

2. Chapters 12 and 13
In chapters 12 and 13, at least when the scheduled payments
exceed the length of the plan, the cure price need only be paid
''within a reasonable time. " 344 If the scheduled payments do not
exceed the length of the plan, then neither § 1222(b) (5) nor
§ 1322(b)(5) apply to authorize cure within "a reasonable time."
These short-term mortgages present the same dilemma on payment
terms as do all security agreements in chapter 11: when must the
cure price be paid for such security agreements?
At least we know that the cure proce for long-term security
agreements in chapters 12 and 13 need not be paid immediately but
instead may be stretched over a reasonable time. But what is "areasonable time?" It is quite often suggested that cure over the entire
life of the chapter 13 plan is acceptable, 345 but that spreading the
cure over the life of the plan is not per se reasonable either. 346 The

2
""
See sufrra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Judge Clark suggested if
cure could be accomplished over time, then disimpairment would itself become a cram- down
technique in competition with§ 1129(b). See Jones, 32 B.R. at 959. In truth, that is the role of
reinstatement-to compete with cram down as a technique. This last remark therefore lacks
bite.
""" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b)(5), 1322(b)(5) (1994).
4

Id.
""' See In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton,].); Central Fed. Savs. & Loan
Ass'n v. King (In re King), 23 B.R. 779 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (Volinn, J.); In re Hatcher, 202
B.R. 626, 630-31 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (Comish,].); Epps v. Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc. (In
re Epps), ll0 B.R. 691, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (McGiynn,J.); In re Chavez, ll7 B.R. 730 (Bankr.
""

S.D. Fla. 1990) (Cristo), J.).
""" See First Nat'l .Bank v. Sidelinger (In re Sidelinger), 175 B.R. 115, 117-20 (Bankr. D. Me.

1997]

Rake's Progress

341

time might even extend beyond the duration of the very agreement
that is reinstated, where the agreement matured within the life of
the plan.M7 In any case, since the chapter 12 or 13 plan cannot last
beyond five years, 3411 this five year period will surely be the maximum time in which the cure price may be paid. 349 At least one
applellate opinion exists, however, that found 25 years-the life of
the mortgage-to be a reasonable time. 350
The Bankruptcy Code is not explicit as to whether cram down
interest must be paid in order to commensurate future payment with
present value of the cure. In Rake v. Wade, 351 the Supreme Court
made clear that postconfirmation interest compensation is required
when a creditor is oversecured. In fact, Justice Clarence Thomas
ruled that both preconfirmation and postconfirmation interest components were needed to accomplish the cure. 352 Yet becaµse he relied on § 1325(a)(5), which applies only to secured claims, he left
unclear whether undersecured creditors were entitled to cram down
interest.
The 1994 amendment clearly reverses this holding. According to
new § 1322(e), cure is governed by the contract notwithstanding
§ 1325(a) (5). 353 Carefully read, this provision governs "the amount
necessary to cure the default." 354 In other words, the cure price is
to be defined by state law. How this price is to be paid-now or over
time-is not necessarily consigned to contractual governance.
Hence, courts might still decide that cram down interest is not nee1994) (Haines, J.) (so concluding but nevertheless allowing cure over life of plan); In re
Acevedo, 9 B.R. 852 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Parente,].) (finding cure over three years unreasonably long). Judge Gregory Kishel has decreed that any payment lasting more than twelve
months is presumed unreasonable. See In re Newton, 161 B.R. 207, 210-11 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1993). But see In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 730, 731 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (Cristol,J.) (even suggesting a presumed deadline would be impermissible judicial legislation).
347
See In re East, 172 B.R. 861, 867 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) (Greendyke, ].).
""" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(d) (1994).
""" See Capps, 836 F.2d at 776 (five-year cure allowed); In re Molitor, 133 B.R. 1020 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1991) (Hill, J.). In In re Masterson, 147 B.R. 295, 296-97 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992), Judge
James Yacos noted that court approval is needed for a chapter 13 plan to extend beyond three
years. He thought the very need to stretch out payment of the cure price justified extension of
the plan.
0
'"
See PNC Mortgage Co. v. Dicks, 199 B.R. 674 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (Sharp,].).
"'' 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].).
'" Id. at 475.
"'' Prior to 1994, the "contractual theory" of cure held that§ 506(b) was inapplicable to
the amount of the cure price. See, e.g., Landmark Fin. Servs. v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150, 1153 (4th
Cir. 1990) (Hall,J.).
'"' 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (1994).
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essarily required to defer payment. That is, courts might decide that
the cure price is contractual, but the payment terms are a matter of
federal law.
The contrary argument is that§ 1322(e) calls for the contract to
govern "notwithstanding"§ 1325(a)(5). This grammar suggests that
Congress viewed the contract as capable of governing the way a cure
price is to be paid. Of course, the contract cannot contradict any
part of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the contract could not provide
that the cure price must be paid in cash on the effective date of the
plan, because§ 1322(b) (5) indicates that the price may be paid over
"a reasonable time." A contractual prov1S1on calling for
postconfirmation interest, however, would not contradict the Bankruptcy Code. It would only supplement it. Therefore, it is possible
that the contract or nonbankruptcy law could produce
postconfirmation interest, but absent authority from those sources,
the Bankruptcy Code itself does not provide for it. 35.,;
If cram down interest is awarded on deferred payment of the
cure price, it will in part constitute interest on interest on interest.
This thrice compounded interest rate might be raised to still higher
powers if a chapter 13 debtor is permitted to cure defaults on cram
down interest with the modification of the plan, as many courts allow. 356
D. Avoidance Powers

Cure implies that a bankruptcy trustee must waive all sorts of
rights that otherwise might be asserted against secured creditors to
belittle and minimize their rights. Thus, cure should imply that a
trustee waives all avoidance powers against a secured creditor. 357
!If,, For a case in which the contract was allowed to set the cram down rate in lieu of the
market, see In re Cureton, 163 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (Spector, J.). This conclusion is based on a reading of Nobelman and Rake whereby the contract was thought
unmodifiable, even after calculation of the cure price. This is not a necessary reading of either
Supreme Court decision and in addition overlooks the fact that cures are to be calculated
"notwithstanding"§ 1322(b)(2).
Judge Arthur Spector went on to note that the cure price consisted of overdue principal
and overdue fees and charges. Id. at 496. Because the contract called for a high rate of interest
on principal (but not other. charges) Spector required that plan payment first be allocated to
the charges and then to principal. Id. at 496-97. Presumably, Spector thought that no cram
down interest was owed on the charges. His allocation thereby maximized the interest expense
on the debtor.
!lf,o See supra notes 224-53 and accompanying text.
357
When transfers are made pursuant to an executory contract which· a bankruptcy trustee
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The loss of a security interest is certainly an impairment of the
prepetition rights of the creditor. For this reason, it has been held
that, in spite of§ 552(a), which destroys a secured creditor's afteracquired property rights in a prepetition security agreement, reinstatement of a security agreement implies the restoration of those
rights.358
A few courtsc have suggested otherwise. In Citicorp Acceptance Co.
v. Ruti-Sweetwater (In re Sweetwater), 359 the debtor wished to disimpair
the secured claim and to reserve the right to avoid the mortgage
after confirmation. Judge Bruce Jenkins held that reinstatement
might still occur because "the threat of litigation arose by operation
of law-not because of the plan." 360 Because cure and reinstatement imply a Pavlovian affirmative vote on the plan, a creditor facing ruination by avoidance of a lien is not allowed to vote on a plan
because, pending the actual avoidance, such a creditor is not
deemed to be impaired. The fairness of this disenfranchisement has
been found deserving of criticism. 361
A more extreme version of this principle outside the context of
secured credit is In re American Solar King Corp. 362 In American Solar
King, the debtor claimed that securities plaintiffs who sought to
rescind the purchase of their equity securities were unimpaired, even
though the plan would pay them nothing. 363 The debtor argued
that§ 510(b) subordinated such claims. Therefore, paying the securities plaintiffs nothing constituted "leav[ing] unaltered the legal,
equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest
entitles the holder of such claim or interest. " 364 Judge Leif Clark
found merit in the claim. 35.,; When applied to secured creditors,
this case produces disturbing results. For example, suppose a secured party has received a voidable preference, but the debtor wish-

later assumes, the voidable preference authorities are divided as to whether voidable preference actions can be brought. See David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in tne Crucible of Voidable
Preferences Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 350-56.
"'"' See In re Blackwelder Furniture Co., 31 B.R. 878, 881-82 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983)
(Wooten,].).
0
""
57 B.R. 354 (D. Utah. 1985) Oenkins,j.).
,.., Id. at 357.
:mi Evan D. Flaschen, The Martgagee and the Real Estate Reorganization Debt<1r, 105 BANKING
LJ. 188, 210 (1988).
362
90 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Clark,].).
"" Seeid.at814.
'"" Id. at 819 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) (1988)).
'"" See id. at 818.
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es to disimpair the contract. According to Judge Clark's reasoning, if
th.e plan gives to the secured creditor exactly what the Bankruptcy
Code provides, the secured creditor is not impaired within the
meaning of§ 1124(1) and so cannot vote on the plan. "Leaves unal-"
tered" cannot mean the post-Bankruptcy Code assessment of
entitlements. If such meaning is given to § 1124(1), no creditor is
ever impaired so long as the bankruptcy trustee gives every creditor
what the Bankruptcy Code requires them to be given. In truth, the
securities claimants should have been viewed as impaired and hence
allowed to vote.
A similar line of reasoning was followed by Judge Francis
Conrad in In re Tavern Motor Inn, Inc. 366 Judge Conrad reasoned
that since a debtor in possession does not have to pay postpetition
interest to an undersecured creditor pursuant to § 502(b), such
interest is never due and owing. Therefore, no default occurred
when the debtor failed to pay postpetition interest. Yet,
§ 1124(2) (A) does compel the debtor to cure defaults "that occurred before or after the commencement of the case." 367 It has
been suggested that Judge Conrad's decision ignores this provision.368 But this does not exactly address Judge Conrad's point, ·
which is that there were no postpetition defaults, once the effect of
§ 502(b) was considered. A better answer is that "cure" should not
comprehend the postpetition entitlements of a creditor. Rather cure
should only comprehend the rights stemming from breach of the
contract, as if no bankruptcy proceeding had ever been commenced.
On this view, some sort of postpetition interest would be
due-whether at a market or contract rate. Section 502(b) could not
be cited to prove that the creditor does not deserve postpetition
interest.

E. Is Cure a Modification?
Prior to 1994, courts were bitterly divided over whether cure is a
modification of a mortgage agreement. At that time, the question
was important, because § 1322(b) (5) permitted "cure" of long term
mortgages "notwithstanding" the antimodification rule in
§ 1322(b)(2). Cure of short-term mortgages, however, had to be
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'
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•r.•

56 B.R. 449 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (Conrad,J.).
11 U.S.C. § 1124(2){A) (1994) (emphasis added).
See Flaschen, supra note 361, at 212.
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accomplished under§ 1322(b)(3), which lacked a "notwithstanding"
clause. If cure constituted a modification, then the antimodification
rule of § 1322(b)(2) prevented short term home mortgages from
being cured.
To prevent this implication, many courts held cure is not modification. They pointed out that§ 1322(b) itself distinguishes between
"modification," permitted except for home mortgages under
§ 1322(b) (2), and "cure," permitted under § 1322(b) (3). This distinction was supposed to prove that cure does not offend the rights
of a secured party claiming only the debtor's residence. 369 On this
view, a debtor may indulge in cures under § 1322(b) (3) without
regard to the antimodification rule of § 1322(b) (2). 370 Moreover,
the function of§ 1322(b) (5) was simply to empower a court to reinstate a security agreement beyond the life of the chapter 13 plan,
something § 1322(b) (3) does not refer to. Cure per se was not in
violation of§ 1322(b) (2).
In Wade v. Hannon, 371 Judge James Logan vociferously insisted
that to cure a security agreement implied that it had been modified. 372 According to Judge Logan, cure is a modification of the
contract, and therefore cure, in general, must not be a contractual
idea. 373 This left Judge Logan free to award postpetition interest as
part of cure, even though the contract didn't call for it. 374 In the
end, however, Judge Logan insisted (like Justice Thomas would later
do on appeal) that §§ 506(b) and 1325(a) (5) apply to cure claims,
in order to justify preconfirmation and postconfirmation interest

31
m See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Savs. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 241 n.9, 247 (5th Cir. 1984)
(en bane) (Tate,J.).
0
"
See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1376 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton, J.); Grubbs, 730 F.2d at
247 (using§ 1322(b)(3) to cure junior mortgage of less than three years); Di Pierro v. Taddeo
(In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard,].).
371
968 F.2d 1036, 1040-42 (10th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464
(1993) (Thomas,].).
m Justice Thomas, on appeal, agreed. See Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 473 n.9 (1993)
(Thomas,].).
373
See Wade, 968 F.2d at 1040.
374
See id. at 1040-42. If cure is not modification, then the language in § 1322(b) (5) allowing cure "notwithstanding" § 1322(b) (2) is surplusage, which at least one judge freely admitted. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 13775 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton, J.). It has also been suggested that, if cure is not modification, then § 1322(b) (2) and (3) would be superfluous as
well. See In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1984) (Marshall, J.). This is refutable. Cure
might be a subset of modification. If so, § 1322(b) (2) has utility to explain that all other types
of modifications except cure are prohibited. Section 1322(b) (2) and (3) therefore prevent every
type of modification of a home mortgage-including cram down-that is not a cure.
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payments respectively. 375 These points are not affected by the characterization of cure as a modification one way or the other. 376
Some courts had ruled that § 1325(a) (5)-cram down-only
applies if a security agreement has been "modified." Cure, they
thought, is not a "modification." Therefore, § 1325(a) (5) cannot
apply to cure, and it cannot dictate cram down interest on the
cure. 377 What these courts are really suggesting is that cure is a sui
generis claim that combines both prepetition and postpetition
claims. In contrast, § 1325(a) (5) governs secured claims, which cover
postpetition defaults only if the creditor is oversecured. 378 This is
the position that Rake v. Wade overruled,379 but which was ultimately vindicated when the 1994 amendments demanded the cure price
be calculated "notwithstanding" cram down.
Whether cure constitutes a modification is now a useless question in chapter 13. Since adoption of the 1994 amendments, a chapter 13 debtor may modify a short-term mortgage. 380 As to long-term
mortgages, the cure may proceed "notwithstanding" the
antimodification rule in § 1322(b)(2). Thus, absent a distinction in
treatment between short and long term mortgages with regard to
modification, the question of whether cure constitutes a modification is moot.

F. Cure as Dependent on Reinstatement
Often debtors owe a lump sum payment to a creditor, as where
the security agreement, without an event of acceleration, has ended
by its terms and requires a balloon payment to retire the entire debt.
May a debtor "cure" this security agreement by paying off the loan
agreement in the reorganization plan?
Since 1994, this question is of little import in chapter 13. Prior
to 1994, home mortgages could not be modified. 381 Meanwhile,

75

See Wade, 968 F.2d at 1041.
"" Judge Logan also noted that Ron Pair had held oversecured creditors with no contractual rights were entitled to postpetition interest. Why not then oversecured mortgagees whose
contracts were silent as to interest on interest as a mode of cure? See id. at 1041.
m Landmark Fin. Servs. v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hall, J.); Roach,
824 F.2d at 1375; In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773, 776 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton,].).
37
" See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
"" 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
"'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994).
"'' 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
'
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cures under § 1322(b) (5) were authorized "notwithstanding"
§ 1322(b)(2) only when payments were due after the end of the
chapter 13 plan. If a mortgage was fully mature (without the aid of
acceleration), debtors were anxious to "cure" mortgages over the life
of the chapter 13 plan under§ 1322(b)(3). If payment of the entire
mortgage (while reinstating nothing) was a cure (and if cure was
consistent with the antimodification rule), 382 debtors could achieve
the cure over the three to five year period of the plan, instead of
paying immediate cash to the mortgagee.
Many courts held that cure did not contemplate payment of the
entire amount due and owing. Rather, cure required some degree of
"reinstatement." Accordingly, debtors could not use § 1322(b) (3) to
override § 1322(b) (2) 's insistence that home mortgages not be modified. The plan could not defer payment over time but had to pay
cash to any creditor with a mature claim. 383
Other courts have disagreed, holding that payment in full is a
cure. 384 In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Sup-

3112
See supra notes 369-80 and accompanying text.
'"" See First Nat'! Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61, 65-66 (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton, J.);

Justice v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1988) (Gibson, J.); Seidel v.
Larson (In re Seidel), 752 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985) (Farris,].); In re French, 174 B.R. 1,
7-8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Boroff,].); Linzmeier v. Bull's Eye Credit Union (In re Linzmeier),
138 B.R. 59, 62 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) (Martin, C. J.); In re La Brada, 132 B.R. 512, 516
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Duberstein, C.J.).
In United States Trust Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 150 B.R. 529 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 170 B.R. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),Judge Burton Lifland ruled that a postmaturity interest rate had to be distinguished from a postdefault interest rate, where the original
schedule of payments had not yet run out. Reinstatement might reestablish the predefault
rate, but reinstatement could not be accomplished when the loan agreement reached its natural maturity. See id. at 542-43. This view implies that paying the secured claim does not cure it.
If it did, it might be possible to pay the prematurity interest rate under the authorities that
rule that the cure price can be calculated on the assumption of the predefault rate.
3114
See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Savs. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 247 (5th Cir. 1984) (en
bane) (Tate, J.) (suggesting that any claim accruing before bankruptcy might be cured under
§ 1322(b)(3)); Larkins v. Commercial Bank (In re Larkins), 50 B.R. 984 (W.D. Ky. 1985)
Oohnstone,J.); In re]ohnson, 184 B.R. 570, 572-73 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (Dreher,].) (holding that since secured claim was paid in full, it was "cured," and the court would use its discretion to use predefault contract rate, rather than the postdefault contract rate); In re Eason, 181
B.R. 127 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Cohen,].); In re Hart, 184 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995)
(Glenn, J.); In re Dixon, 151 B.R. 388, 392-94 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1993) (Ellington, J.); In re
Aguirre, 150 B.R. 922, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (Akard, J.); In re PCH Assocs., 122 B.R.
181, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Blackshear, J.) (dictum); Vitelli v. Cheltenham Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n (In re Vitelli), 93 B.R. 889, 894-95 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl,].). In In re Watson, 190 B.R. 32 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995), involving a mortgage on commercial real estate,Judge
David Scholl unnecessarily ruled that, where the mortgage had fully matured prior to the
chapter 13 plan, it could still be "cured"-i.e., paid off over time. In fact, he should have sim-
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ply, Inc. (In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, lnc.),385 the loan at issue
was entirely mature. The secured party was oversecured and hence
entitled to postpetition interest under§ 506(b). The loan agreement
called for a higher postmaturity interest rate. The debtor proposed a
chapter 11 plan that would pay cash to the secured creditor, but
with interest calculated at the predefault rate. The secured creditor,
on the other hand, claimed that it was entitled to the contract rate
of interest, by which it meant the higher postdefault rate. 386
Judge Joseph Sneed upheld the debtor's plan on grounds that
the debtor was entitled to "cure" the claim at predefault rates. 387
Cure meant the restoration of the status quo ante, which Sneed took
to mean paying as if payment had occurred on the day the loan
matured. Of course, under this premise, no interest was due and
owing.
A better approach to resolving this issue would have been for
Judge Sneed to rule that the payment of the full claim in cash is not
"cure and reinstatement," but rather, that cure is the retrospective
price of prospective reinstatement. Without reinstatement going
forward, cure of past defaults is meaningless and not permitted. As
to the interest rate to which the oversecured creditor in Entz-White
was entitled, § 506(b) governed the proper interest rate for the
oversecured creditor in question. Accordingly, that rate should have
been the market rate, not the contract rate.
It is probable that Judge Sneed resorted to his definition of
cure because he feared that § 506(b) would institute the contract
rate. Indeed, ill-conceived dictum in the Ninth Circuit had stated so
directly. 388 Therefore, cure was apparently used by Judge Sneed to
displ,ace § 506(b) as the operative theory of the case. 389 Ironically,
Rake v. Wade declared § 506(b) to be the theme of cure after all,

ply ruled that the mortgage could have been modified through cram down. There was no sense
in calling cram down a "cure," since there was no need to get past the antimodification rule of
§ 1322(b)(2).
""-' 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988) (Sneed,].).
""'; See id. at 1339.
""; See id. 1342.
""" Joseph F. Sanson Investment Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 676 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Goodwin, J.) (stating that interest under§ 506(b) should be at the contract rate
regardless of whether it is reasonable).
""" See Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1343 n.7 (concluding that§ 1124(2) (C) compels payment of
interest even if no equity cushion exists); cf. In re Johnson, 184 B.R. 570, 574 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1995) (Dreher,].) (reading .Entz-White as assuming§ 506(b) governs cure claims, but that cure
leads to lower predefault interest rate).
·
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thereby contradicting Entz-White, but Rake also implied that the appropriate rate for use was the market rate. Congress in turn has
overruled Rake in this regard, but by no means does it follow that
Entz-White's definition of cure should govern. The 1994 enactment of
§ 1123(d) only establishes that a cure price is to be calculated "notwithstanding" § 506 (b). The question still remains open as to whether merely paying a creditor (without reinstating anything) is a cure.
To summarize, if the idea is to prevent the postdefault interest rate
from being charged, courts should define cure to require some
degree of reinstatement (the opposite of Entz-White) and should rule
that § 506(b) governs. Moreover, courts should hold that § 506(b)
establishes the market rate, thereby disenfranchising the contract
altogether.
Another part of the 1994 amendments can be taken -to contradict Entz-White. Prior to 1994, disimpairment meant either cure or
paying the claim in cash. Congress eliminated the latter and kept
the former. If Entz-White is the law, then congressional elimination of
disimpairment through payment is utterly defeated. That is, if payment in full is cure, then payment in full is disimpairment, contrary
to legislative desire. Hence, Congress must have intended that cure
is more than just payment in full. Cure must require some element
of reinstatement. For this additional reason the 1994 amendments
should be viewed as overruling Entz-White.
In Entz-White, Judge Sneed did not want to impose the default
rate, but wished to honor Ninth Circuit dictum equating § 506(b)
with the contract rate. 390 Yet, in bowing down before this questionable dictum, Judge Sneed ran up against a second Ninth Circuit
case. In Seidel v. Larson (In re Seidel),391 Judge Jerome Farris ruled
that, absent some reinstatement going forward, payment in full
could not be viewed as cure. Hence, a chapter 13 debtor could not
cure a fully mature home mortgage debt by paying it over the life of
a chapter 13 plan. To do so would be to modify the mortgage in
violation of§ 1322(b) (2). 392
To distinguish Seidel from Entz-White, Judge Sneed noted that
the Seidel cure would have been paid over the life of a chapter 13

990

See Entz-White 850 F.2d at 1343.
752 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985).
392
The violation of§ 1322(b)(2) by modifying a mortgage has been overruled by the 1994
amendments. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(l) (1994). Accord, First National Fidelity Bank v. Perry,
945 F.2d 61, 65, (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton,].).
391
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plan. In Entz-White, the cure would be paid in cash. 393 On this basis,
Sneed ruled that the Seidel situation did not represent a cure. Although in Seidel Judge Farris emphasized the absence of reinstatement as the disqualifying factor, 394 Judge Sneed reinterpreted Seidel
to mean that "cure" refers to cash payment-not deferred payment.395 On the reasoning of Entz-White, therefore, "cure" under
§ 1322(b) (5) may be accomplished over a "reasonable time" because
Congress modified "cure" with this extra clause. "Cure" simpliciter
means present cash payment.
The Entz-White definition of cure has been extended to absurd
lengths in Casa Blanca Lenders, L.P. v. City Commerce Bank (In re Casa
Blanca Lenders, L.P.). 396 In this case, the debtor did not even propose a reorganization plan. Instead, the debtor sold collateral under
§ 363 (b) and wished to surrender cash proceeds directly to the secured party for payment in full. The secured party insisted on the
postdefault interest rate, but Judge Sidney Volinn, on the strength of
Entz-White's definition of "cure," ruled that the predefault rate could
be used. 397
Section 1124(2) now indicates that a cure must be accomplished
in a plan. Hence, payment before the confirmation of a plan could
never be a cure. Nothing in § 363 authorizes cure. 398 Furthermore,
though the Casa Blanca Lenders opinion is not perfectly clear, it appears as if the secured claim was not fully mature, but rather an
accelerated obligation. If so, to pay was to cure, even though the
contract itself called for a schedule of future payments. Rather than
engage in such interpretive difficulty, Judge Volinn should have
ruled that§ 506(b) applied, and that§ 506(b) implies a market rate
as opposed to a contract rate. This would have effectively avoided
the unfair postdefault interest rate. Meanwhile, cure should imply

"'' See Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1342 .
.,,. See Seide~ 752 F.2d at 1386.
395
See Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1341.
3116

7

196 B.R. 140 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (Volinn,J.).

See id. at 141.
"''" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124(2), 363 (1994).Judge Kathleen Lax remarked that, "one cannot,
by its absence from the text of section 363, leap to the conclusion that 'cure' and any legal
considerations Qased on the concept of cure have no application to the sale and consequent
payment of obligations under section 363." In re 433 South Beverley Drive, 117 B.R 563, 566
(Bankr. C.D 7 Cal. 1990).Judge Lax noted that§ 365 refers to cure, thereby supposedly proving
that cure exists outside the context of a chapter 11 plan. See id. Section 365, though, is a section limited to executory contracts, not "executed" loan agreements. See 11 U.S.C. § 365
(1994).
"'
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that a security agreement has been reinstated with regard to payment of interest and principal going fmward.

IV. A COMPENSATORY THEORY OF CURE
The incoherence of case law on cure can be attributed to the
failure of the courts to develop a principled concept of what constitutes "cure" of a default. At most, courts offered exampl,es of cure.
Now, in an effort to clarify the issue, Congress has developed its own
contractual theory. Yet this theory runs up against the fact that,
where a contract too greedily demands entitlements upon default,
the contract institutes a penalty and not a cure.
Cure must therefore have a compensatory soul, in spite of the
1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. In order to develop the
Dorian Gray portrait relevant to this area of law, I offer the following
principles.
The cure of a loan agreement has as its goal reinstatement of
the agreement going forward. Parties to the contract thus obtain the
exact benefit of their bargain, as if no default had occurred and no
bankruptcy petition had been filed. Cure implies that a debtor
should be able to deaccelerate the loan and reestablish the scheduled payments as contemplated in the loan agreement. Of course,
defaults have occurred. No remedy can retroactively change this
historical fact. What remedies can do, however, is to make a creditor
objectively indifferent to the fact of this history.
A creditor should be entitled to compensation rendering the
creditor indifferent to default. Thus, monetary amounts that became
due in the ordinary course should now be paid as the price of the
cure. 399 Since the point of cure is deacceleration, the amounts due
and owing must be calculated without regard to acceleration. Otherwise, cure would swallow acceleration whole, leaving no future payment schedule to reinstate. 400
Because the idea is to render the creditor indifferent to the fact
of default, the creditor should receive the interest compensation at
market rate between the time of the default and the time the cure
price is calculated. 401 It may strike one as strange that market rates

0!1!l See In re Cureton, 163 B.R. 494, 495-96 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (Spector,].).
""" See Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J.) .
...,, See Jonathan S. Fields, Note, Taking Interest in a Cure: Compensation for Time Value of
Chapter 13 Residential Mortgage Arrears, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2130 (1992). In Cardinal Feder-
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of interest should be paid as part of cure, when cure is the price for
reinstating a lower contractual rate of interest. 402 The paradox, however, is a false· one. Reinstatement was premised on placing the secured creditor in precisely the position she would have enjoyed had
the contract never been breached. True, a default may be the failure
to pay the contract rate of interest at some designated time in the
past. But in order to reinstate the secured creditor to her precise
economic position, it is necessary to commensurate the past default
with present cure by employing a market rate of interest. The market
rate is justified by the premise that, had the debtor actually paid
when she was supposed to, the secured creditor could have reinvested the contractually-set interest payment in a market-rate investment
vehicle. Thus, the market rate is totally consistent with reinstatement
of the contractual rate of interest.
It is sometimes argued that, when a contract does not call for
interest on arrears, awarding such interest as part of cure constitutes
a "modification" of the home mortgage agreement and therefore
should be blocked by the antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2).403
The easy answer to this challenge is that cure may be accomplished
"notwithstanding"§ 1322(b)(2). Hence, the antimodification rule is
incompetent to block a compensatory theory of cure.
·
Loan agreements often impose a higher postdefault rate of
interest upon debtors. Again, the spirit of cure and reinstatement is
to return the secured creditor to the position that she would have
occupied had no defaults been sustained and no bankruptcy petition
filed. Hence, cure should ignore any postdefault terms and any liqui- ,
dated damage clause. Instead, only the ordinary course payments,

al Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cokgrove (In re Cokgrove), 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985),Judge Harry
Wellford ruled that the market rate at the time a secured claim was allowed should be used.
See id. at 123. But the idea of cure (as presented here) is to make the creditor whole at the
time of reaffirmation, so that no losses are felt from past breaches and the contract flows into
the future. This suggests that only the prevailing rate at the time of reaffirmation should
count.
Although compensation implies market rates of interest to commensurate past monetary
defaults and the present price of cure, it does not imply that attorneys' fees should be paid
unless the contract or local law makes this part of the state-law remedy. In other words, where
state law follows the traditional American rule that each side bears the cost of her own attorney, the rule should apply to the concept of cure as well. See In re Small, 65 B.R. 686, 693
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (Scholl,].), affd, 76 B.R. 390 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (Schapiro,].).
02
'
See Cokgrove, 771 F.2d at 124 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (posing this point as a paradox).
"'" See Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 114 B.R. 214, 217-18
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (Perris,].), affd, 944 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991) (Leavy,J.).
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supplemented by market rates of interest, may be included in the
ideal cure price.
Many loan agreements require the debtor to pay what§ 506(b)
calls "fees, costs, or charges" related to enforcement of the loan
agreement. 404 Any such fee, cost, or charge that constitutes an outof-pocketloss to the creditor should be included in the cure price,
to the extent that the contract requires the debtor to reimburse the
creditor for such expenses. Interest compensation on these losses
should likewise be added to the cure price. In fact, a compensatory
theory requires compensation for attorneys' fees and the like even if
the contract does not so specify, because the idea is to make creditors indifferent to the fact of default as the price of reinstatement.
Such fees should be reasonable, of course, under the ordinary mitigation principles that temper the tyrrany of damages.
At a time certain, the trustee or debtor will have calculated a
single cure price, composed of ordinary course principal and interest payments (whether falling due before or after the bankruptcy
petition), out-of-pocket losses for which the debtor is contractually
bound to pay, and market rates of interest on the above amounts, to
render the creditor indifferent to the fact of default. This lump sum
price is what the debtor must pay to exercise the right to reinstate
the loan agreement.
As of when must this price be paid? In order to reconcile the
above theory of cure with the existing reorganization chapters, I
propose that, in chapter 11 cases, the debtor in possession or trustee
must pay cash on the effective date of the plan. In chapters 12 and
13, the debtor may pay the cure price over the life of the plan. The
rationale for this distinction is that the cure price is a postpetition
expenditure made at the option of the trustee or debtor in order to
exercise the privilege of reinstatement. In this respect, the cure price
represents an administrative expense. Therefore, payment terms
should match the terms under which any other administrative expense must be paid.
In chapter 11, administrative claims must be paid in cash on the
effective date of the plan. 405 In chapters 12 and 13, administrative
claims may be paid over the life of the plan406 (i.e., over three to

404

11 U.S.C. § 506(B) (1994).

15
"'
06
'

See 11 u.s.c. § 1129(a)(9)

(1994).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(a)(2), 1322(a)(2) (1994).
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five years) .407 These rules should be borrowed to govern payment
of the cure price. Currently, §§ 1222(b) (5) and 1322(b) (5) permit
the cure price to be paid over "a reasonable time." 408 This phrase
is opaque and is in any case usually interpreted to mean the cure
price is to be paid over the life of the chapter 12 or 13 plan. 409
The Bankruptcy Code should make explicit what a great many courts
are doing anyway.
If the cure price is paid on the above terms, then the loan
agreement is reinstated. In chapter 11, the effect of reinstatement
ought to be that the secured creditor is deemed unimpaired. As
such, the secured creditor is deemed to be an affirmative vote on
the plan for cram down purposes. In other words, the secured party
is not entitled to bring any cram down objections to confirmation,
even if the present value of the cure price and the reinstatement is
less than the value of the collateral. This effect of cure and reaffirmation accords with current law.
At this point, it is important to remember that cure is an adjunct
to reinstatement. Cure is merely the price a debtor must pay for the
privilege of reinstatement - .it has no independent life. If a loan
agreement is already mature according to its terms, there is nothing
to reinstate and cure becomes irrelevant. A creditor in such a position is entitled to vote and thereby to trigger cram down protections.
Note that this last suggestion does constitute a reversal of at least
some case law which interprets "cure" as including the payoff of a
claim already due and owing, without regard to acceleration. 410 On
the view being offered here, the point of cure would be the performance· of some act of deacceleration.
In chapters 12 and 13, a reinstated claim should prevent the
secured creditor from claiming any cram down protections under
§ 1222(a) or § 1322(a). Because the premise of cure and reinstatement is the absolute indifference of the creditor to the fact of default and bankruptcy, the creditor should have no standing to object
to the confirmation of the plan, so long as the cure price has been
correctly calculated and dealt with in the plan. This suggestion sides
with the 1994 amendments against Rake v. Wade, 411 but would ex-

407

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(d) (1994).

°" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b) (5), 1322(b)(5) (1994).

4
•

09

410

411

See supra notes 344-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].).
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tend these amendments, which now excuse compliance only with
§ 1222(a) (5) and § 1322(a) (5). These cram down provisions relate
only to secured claims. An undersecured creditor holding an unsecured deficit claim should likewise be incapable of asserting any
cram down protection under§ 1222(a) (4) or§ 1322(a) (4), since the
undersecured creditor will be rendered indifferent to the fact of
plan confirmation. 412
The option to cure and reinstate must eventually come to an
end. Prior to 1994, the case law was fiercely divided on this question.
Some courts equated the right to cure with the debtor's continued
ownership in the collateral, though such an equation is by no means
logically compelled. 413 Other courts reasoned that, if a judgment
had- been rendered, the contract merged with the judgment and
could no longer be revived. 414 The 1994 amendments declared that
cure may be accomplished at least until a foreclosure sale has occurred. 415 This is already being read to mean that cure after the
foreclosure sale is impossible.416 A better rule would focus on inconvenience to third parties. Thus, when a foreclosure sale involving
a third party buyer has occurred, the trustee or debtor may not cure
the contract and deprive the buyer of the collateral. But, where the
creditor still owns the collateral as the result of a bid-in sale, cure
should still be possible. 417 Merger-a state law concept-should not
govern the federal policy of cure and reinstatement. Thus, when a
bid-in sale has occurred the same instinct that leads to rejecting the
judgment of foreclosure as the deadline also leads to rejecting the
sale as the deadline. This is especially so because bid-in sales are so
notoriously abusive in consumer contexts. Even bid-in buyers pay
cash to some degree-,-such as when retiring senior liens or reimbursing the sheriff. Debtors or trustees should be required to reimburse the bid-in buyer for these amounts before a contract can be

412
In this respect, it may be noted that new§ l 123(d) indicates that cure is "notwithstand•
ing section 1129(a)(7)"-the "best interest of the creditors" test. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994).
No such exception exists in the chapter 12 and 13 analogs. Congress should make clear that
the "best interest" test is repealed in these chapters whenever a loan agreement is cured and
reinstated.
413
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
414
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
4
"' See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
416
See supra note 169-70 and accompanying text.
417
See Barry L. Zaretsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in Chapter 13, 50 BROOK. L. REV.
433, 449-50 (1984) (arguing for this position).
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reinstated.
To summarize, the difference between the pure compensatory
theory being proposed here and the R.ake v. Wade theory relying on
§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) is ,that the compensatory theory would
apply to over- and undersecured creditors alike. Sections 506(b) and
1325(a) (5) apply only to oversecured creditors, leaving no theory of
cure for undersecured creditors. The difference between a compensatory theory and the contractual theory adopted in the 1994
amendments is that under the former, courts can ignore default
penalties and postdefault interest rates called for in the contract.
This view comports with the current structure of the Bankruptcy
Code's governance of allowed claims. Cure is not a secured claim
when the collateral is insufficient to cover both the cure price and
principal not yet due under the reinstated agreement. Neither can
cure be considered a prepetition unsecured claim under § 502 (b),
because cure includes both prepetition and postpetition
amounts. 418 Finally, a cure cannot be viewed, strictly speaking, as a
postpetition administrative claim,419 since cure includes prepetition
defaults. Administrative claims refer to postpetition expenses
only. 420 To be sure, cure has an .administrative odor to it. Cure is
the price that a debtor or trustee must pay to reinstate a loan agreement. As such, the trustee or debtor chooses to incur the price
postpetition. Cure, in a sense, resembles cross-collateralization terms
in postpetition loans, where, as the price for the loan, the trustee
agrees to pay prepetition amounts. Increasingly, these loan agreements are being treated as illegitimate, because they straddle the
postpetition-prepetition distinction inherent in administrative
claims. 421 Obviously, cure (expressly so in chapter 11) 422 is invited
to breach this gap. Cure is best viewed as a sui generis charge voluntarily undertaken by a debtor in order to buy the privilege of rein-

••• Section 502 includes various "late" claims as exceptions to this rule. None is relevant
here. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).
111
•
See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994).
20
•
Section 503(b)(l)(A) implies this by emphasizing that expenses must be "the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preseIVing the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (l)(A) (1994). The
existence of the estate implies the postpetition time period.
m See Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.
1992) (Cox, J.); David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Security Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 48
Bus. LAW. 483, 497-505 (1993); Charles Jordan Tabb, Requiem for Cross-Collateraliz.ation, 2 J.
BANKR. LAW & PRAC. 109, 154-55 (1993) .
.., See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (A) (1994).
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statement. Cure, therefore, should be accorded the same treatment
as are administrative claims.
So ends my catechism on what Congress ought to do.

V. CONCLUSION
Reinstatement of security agreements is an important concept in
bankruptcy reorganization. It is particularly important in chapters 11
and 13, where reinstatement is the only means by which a debtor
can hold on to her home once she has defaulted on her mortgage.
Reinstatement, however, implies cure of past defaults. Whereas
courts had been divided over whether cure was a compensatory (i.e.,
"tort") concept or a contract concept, the Supreme Court, in Rake v.
Wade, 423 adopted a third view-that§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) governed the cure price. Congress, however, has intervened by shifting
bankruptcy jurisprudence back to the contract theory. The 1994
amendments make clear that, for the most part, the contract is to
govern the notion of cure. 424 This legislative initiative is unfortunate, because many debtors will have a reduced incentive to protect
their future unsecured creditors from secured creditor depredations
in a prepetition agreement. It may now be expected that, in the
name of cure, secured creditors will load on all sorts of expensive
placebos and aroma therapies in order to obtain cure at the highest
level of contractual luxury.
A better theory of cure and reinstatement would be to make
cure purely compensatory and federally preemptive. Under such a
theory, a creditor would be stuck with the bargain actually struck
with the debtor, but the creditor would be rendered indifferent to
the occurrence of bankruptcy, given the bargain. The means of
rendering the creditor indifferent would be to award market rates of
interest on all monetary defaults. This interest compensation would
start to accrue when the monetary default occurs and would continue until the time the cure price is calculated. If the debtor proposes
to pay the cure price over time, market rates must be used again to
assure that the present value of payment over time precisely equals
the cure price.

423

508 U.S. 464 (1993).
The only exception is that federal law imposes the deadline of sale on the power to
cure. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
424

